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STARE DECISIS AND IN TERSYSTEMIC
ADJUDICATION
Nina Varsava*
Interpreting and following precedent is a complicated business. Various
reasonable but conflicting methods of ascertaining the legal effect of precedent exist.
Differences between practices of precedent or doctrines of stare decisis are particularly
salient between legal systems or jurisdictions. For example, a state’s judges might
embrace different stare decisis norms than federal judges. This situation presents a
major quandary for intersystemic jurisprudence that has been largely overlooked in the
scholarly literature.
Are law-applying judges in the intersystemic context bound by the law-supplying
jurisdiction’s methods of interpreting precedent? For example, when the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals adjudicates a question of Wisconsin state law, do the federal
judges have to adopt the interpretive methodology that Wisconsin judges apply to
judicial decisions? It is well-settled that the federal judges have to apply Wisconsin
precedent, but whether the federal judges have to apply Wisconsin’s doctrines of stare
decisis is an open question. Since these doctrines may be highly outcome-determinative,
the intuitive answer would seem to be that they are indeed interjurisdictionally binding.
That answer, however, is too quick.
As this Article documents, in practice judges often do not defer to the lawsupplying jurisdiction’s stare decisis doctrine. Although this lack of deference may seem
inappropriate, it is not always or necessarily a mistake. This Article presents a novel
theory of stare decisis and interpretation in the intersystemic context, which connects
the deference quandary to jurisprudential debates about the very nature of law, showing
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how different legal theories generate different answers to the question of whether, in a
given case, methods of interpreting precedent are interjurisdictionally binding. The
Article thus illuminates the integral relationship between analytical jurisprudence and
a ubiquitous but undertheorized quandary about intersystemic adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION
The interpretive approaches of judges differ substantially across
jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions, for example, are more purposivist,
whereas others lean more textualist. What is a court to do, then, in the
intersystemic context when it is charged with adjudicating a dispute
arising under the substantive law of another jurisdiction? For example,
if the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals exercises diversity jurisdiction
over a Wisconsin state law dispute, is it bound by the methods that
Wisconsin state judges would use to interpret state statutes and
regulations, judicial decisions, and the state constitution?
This issue arises frequently, although often only implicitly, in all
kinds of cases and courts. Federal courts have to interpret state law
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whenever they exercise diversity or supplemental jurisdiction. State
courts are often tasked with interpreting federal law or the law of other
states. Sometimes courts are even charged with interpreting the law of
foreign countries.
Judges, lawyers, and scholars generally agree that, in the
intersystemic context, the law-applying or forum court is not permitted
to just make up the law to be applied, nor to impose the law of its own
jurisdiction. Instead, the forum court must treat the foreign jurisdiction as the law-supplier. The court has the task, accordingly, of
interpreting and applying the law of the other jurisdiction, which
involves identifying that jurisdiction’s sources of law and determining
their legal effect on the dispute at hand.
But must the forum court also apply the methods of interpretation
that courts in the law-supplying jurisdiction would use? If the lawsupplying jurisdiction embraces purposivism as a means of interpretation, then should the forum court follow interpretive suit? What if the
forum court judges believe that textualism is a superior method of
interpretation? And what if they are right about that?
This Article argues that the duty to apply the substantive law of
another jurisdiction does not necessarily entail a duty to apply that
jurisdiction’s interpretive norms. The Article shows how one’s answer
to this question of interjurisdictional interpretation turns on one’s
theory of law. Although I focus on the U.S. federal-state context, my
analysis should apply just as well to any other context where courts in
one jurisdiction apply another jurisdiction’s law. And so the
conclusions reached here have critical implications for our legal
system as well as others.
Under H.L.A. Hart’s positivist theory of law, law-applying judges
will generally have an obligation to defer to the interpretive methods
of the judges in the law-supplying jurisdiction, although in some cases
they will have discretion to depart from those methods and in other
cases even an obligation to do so. In contrast, under Ronald Dworkin’s
competing theory of law as integrity, law-applying judges will often
have an obligation to apply their own interpretive methods to a dispute
arising under another jurisdiction’s law, even if these methods differ
from the interpretive methods of the judges in the law-supplying
jurisdiction.
This Article thus demonstrates the critical relevance of analytical
jurisprudence to conflict of laws theory and practice. To get traction
on vital questions about interpretation in the intersystemic context, we
have to address core philosophical questions about the nature of law,
a point that has been neglected in the existing literature on
interpretation in the intersystemic environment.
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This Article focuses on judicial approaches or methods of
interpreting and applying precedent that themselves are developed
through judicial decisions; I refer to these norms broadly as doctrines
of stare decisis. My main argument, though, should extend to other
types of legal interpretation and application as well, including judicial
approaches to statutory interpretation. I focus on the interpretation
of precedent because the topic has received little attention compared
to its statutory counterpart and has been surprisingly undertheorized,
in both judicial opinions and legal scholarship. At the same time,
conflicting views about the doctrine of stare decisis have come to a
head in recent Supreme Court decisions, revealing deep metaprecedential disagreement among the Justices.1 Conflicts in methods
of statutory interpretation among jurisdictions, courts, and judges have
been well-documented and widely discussed in legal scholarship,
whereas conflicts in methods of precedential interpretation have seen
much less scholarly attention.2 Further, we already have a rich body of
descriptive literature on whether courts treat methods of statutory
interpretation as interjurisdictionally binding,3 but the corollary
question of interjurisdictional deference to methods of precedential
interpretation has received little study.
And yet, a great deal rides on the latter question. The interpretive
methods that judges apply to previously decided cases determine the
rules of decision that those cases represent and accordingly the legal
rights and duties that they provide or impose. And, methods of
construing precedent, just like their statutory and constitutional

1 See, e.g., Nina Varsava, Precedent on Precedent, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 118 (2020)
(analyzing the Justices’ incompatible views in Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020),
about the precedential status of plurality decisions); Richard M. Re, Reason and Rhetoric in
Edwards v. Vannoy, 17 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2022) (discussing the
Justices’ differing views in Edwards v. Vannoy on overruling precedent, extending precedent,
and affording precedent retroactive effect).
2 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for
the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013) (covering statutory, but not
precedential, interpretation); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to
Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (2012) (same); Evan J. Criddle &
Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 Geo. L.J. 1573 (2014) (same);
Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96
GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008) (same); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 479 (2013) (same); George Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils
of Legal Positivism, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 285 (1993) (same).
3 See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 2; Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:
Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation]; Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750
(2010) [hereinafter Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation]; Foster, supra
note 2.
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counterparts, can and do differ across jurisdictions and courts.4 For
example, some courts interpret plurality decisions as binding
precedent and some do not; some courts take the median or middle
opinion of a plurality decision as binding, even if only one judge
endorsed that opinion, whereas other courts search for majority
agreement across all the opinions; some judges insist that all judicial
decisions, even those that are “unpublished,” create binding
precedent, but for others unpublished decisions are not precedential.
This Article takes methods of interpreting plurality or fractured
decisions as a central case study, since these methods tend to be
relatively explicit in judicial opinions, whereas other methods of
interpreting precedent—for example, techniques for separating
holdings from dicta—are more elusive.
For illustrative purposes, I focus on cases of federal courts
interpreting state judicial decisions and state courts interpreting
federal ones. Under the monumental case of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, a federal court adjudicating a state claim has a legal duty to
apply state substantive law, including the judge-made law contained in
state judicial decisions.5 But are the methods that a state’s courts use
to interpret judicial decisions part of the state’s substantive law for Erie
purposes? Likewise, state courts of course have to apply federal
precedent to questions of federal law, but do they necessarily have to
apply federal methods of interpretation in the process?6 Commentators have generally assumed affirmative answers to both questions,
collapsing second-order questions of meta-precedent with first-order
questions of precedent.7 Although that position may be intuitive, this
Article shows that it is too quick.
Through a descriptive analysis of federal courts interpreting state
precedent and vice versa, I show that federal judges often act as though
they are not required to apply a state’s doctrine of stare decisis to a
question arising under the state’s case law, even as they recognize a
4 See infra Sections I.B–C and II.A–B.
5 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), under which federal courts were supposed to apply “federal general
common law” instead of state judicial decisions to state claims that were not governed by
state statutory or constitutional provisions. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
6 The doctrine known as “reverse-Erie” represents the flipside of Erie: state courts
apply federal substantive law, but state procedure, to federal disputes. See, e.g., RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 453–56 (7th ed. 2015)
(explaining that, as a general rule, state courts adjudicating federal claims “apply the same
procedures that apply when state law rights are adjudicated”). The scenarios are not
symmetrical, however, since federal law preempts conflicting state law under the Supremacy
Clause.
7 See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
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duty to apply the state’s substantive law and genuinely endeavor to
fulfill that duty. State courts applying federal precedent demonstrate
greater but far from unequivocal deference to federal stare decisis
doctrine. In the intersystemic context, courts do not treat doctrines of
stare decisis the same as other judge-made doctrines.
The theoretical account of interpretive methodology and
intersystemic adjudication that this Article develops would explain,
and justify, the judicial practices that we observe in the context of
federal-state interjurisdictional interpretation. Moreover, my account
can shed light on the implicit theoretical commitments of both judges
and scholars. A judge’s treatment of stare decisis doctrine in the
interjurisdictional context is indicative of their underlying theory of
law. Likewise, a scholar’s view about the extent to which judges should
defer to the law-supplying jurisdiction on stare decisis methodology
reveals their implicit jurisprudential commitments.
Part I reviews the related literature, and explains how methods of
interpreting precedent can and do conflict. Part II shows how, in
practice, judges often acknowledge that they have a duty to apply the
precedent of another jurisdiction without recognizing a corresponding duty to apply the other jurisdiction’s doctrines of stare decisis. Part
III argues that, as a theoretical matter, methods of interpreting
precedent do not necessarily travel with the underlying law; I show how
our answer to this question of interjurisdictional adjudication depends
on our jurisprudential commitments regarding the nature of law.
I.

PRECEDENT AND INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY

This Part begins by defining some key terms and reviewing the
related literature on interpretive methodology and conflict of laws. It
then turns to an explanation of how methods of interpreting
precedent can and do differ across jurisdictions, and illuminates the
problem with an example of a federal-state conflict in interpretive
approach: the example shows how the same precedent may have
different legal implications in federal and state court as a result of
interjurisdictional differences in stare decisis doctrine.
A. Terminology
By interpretation, I mean the process of ascertaining the relevant
sources of law as well as the legal meaning of those sources—that is,
the legal rights and duties that they represent or generate. This is an
admittedly capacious conception of interpretation, but it is not novel.8
8 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9 & n.29 (1994) (explaining that the two
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In the context of adjudication, the interpretive process involves
identifying the relevant legal materials and determining how they
apply to a live legal dispute—the legal rights they supply and the duties
they impose on the litigants. By methods of interpretation, then, I mean
the techniques that judges use to identify sources of law and ascertain
their legal meaning in the process of deciding cases. For the purposes
of this Article, I focus on one type of legal source—judicial decisions—
and so the methods I am interested in are methods of interpreting
precedent or methods of precedential interpretation: that is, the
techniques, tools, or algorithms that judges use to figure out the legal
rules that past judicial decisions stand for and the effect those rules
have on new disputes that the judges are tasked with adjudicating. I
view these methods as part of stare decisis jurisprudence or doctrine,
since they determine what it means for a court to follow or comply with
stare decisis.
Methods of interpretation are often only implicit in practice,
especially in relatively easy cases that do not raise interpretive disagreement. But under the broad conception of interpretation that this
Article embraces, judges are engaged in interpretation even in clearcut cases where reasonable people would not disagree about what the
applicable legal sources prescribe.9 Other commentators, for example
Professor Andrei Marmor, define interpretation more narrowly; under
Marmor’s conception, the law calls for interpretation only “when its
content is indeterminate in a particular case of its application” and
judges have discretion over the outcome of the case.10 For Marmor,
then, interpretation comes into play in hard cases only. This semantic
difference does not necessarily reflect any substantive difference in our
views, however. I prefer the more expansive usage because it seems to
align better with how judges conceive of adjudication—that is, as
involving interpretation even in determinate cases. Indeed, I want to
reserve judgment on the question of whether indeterminate cases even
exist.11 Even if indeterminacy in law were an illusion, interpretation
would, I believe, remain in the adjudicative picture.

steps of “identifying the relevant sources of law” and interpreting those sources “are
interactive” and are both part of the broader process of interpretation in which judges
engage).
9 See, e.g., RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1–2 (John Bell & Sir George
Engle eds., 3d ed. 1995) (defining interpretation “in the broad sense” as “[t]he process of
reading a statute and applying it”).
10 ANDREI MARMOR, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 145 (2011).
11 Some theorists (perhaps most notably Ronald Dworkin) have suggested that the
law supplies a right answer in all legal disputes. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 279–90 (1977) (arguing, against critics, that “there is one right answer,” even in
hard cases).
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Further, some commentators insist on a conceptual distinction
between legal interpretation and construction, where the former refers to
the discovery of the “linguistic meaning or semantic content of a legal
text” and the latter to the translation of that content into legal
meaning or doctrine.12 I am hesitant to adopt this distinction, because
it seems to me that legal texts do not necessarily have linguistic
meaning apart from their legal context, and once linguistic meaning
is informed by legal context, that meaning is already legal meaning.13
In any event though, this Article’s argument does not depend on a
rejection of the distinction between interpretation and construction.
Those who embrace that distinction should understand my interest
here, despite my terminology, to be in legal construction: that is, the
process of identifying and applying the legal rules that govern a
particular dispute.
B. Related Literature
The scholarly literature on interpretive methodology revolves
around statutory and constitutional interpretation.14 And the problem
of intersystemic conflicts in interpretive methodology has attracted
extensive attention in those contexts.15 Many scholars argue that
12 Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
95, 96, 103 (2010).
13 Professor Richard Fallon, I think, makes a similar point when he says that, “[i]f an
utterance’s linguistic meaning is its meaning in context, and if an utterance occurs in a
legal context, then perhaps any relevant legal norms are elements of the context that
generate linguistic meaning.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114
NW. U. L. REV. 269, 299 (2019).
14 For examples of this scholarly attention to statutory and constitutional
interpretation, see supra note 2. Professor Craig Green is a notable exception to this trend.
See Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents, 94 N.C.
L. REV. 379, 381 (2016) (observing that, in contrast to statutory and constitutional law,
“methodological questions of how to interpret judicial decisions are widely ignored”)
[hereinafter Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope]; Craig Green, Erie and Constitutional Structure:
An Intellectual History, 52 AKRON L. REV. 259, 272–73 (2018) (calling for greater attention to
precedential interpretive methodology and asserting that methods of precedential
interpretation “are just as unrecognized in practice as they are unnamed in theory”). In
the former article, Green identifies different approaches to precedential interpretation,
including originalism and “living precedentialism,” and examines their implications for a
few select precedents. Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope, supra. Using a different kind of
schema, I have delineated various methodological options for following precedent in
previous work. See Nina Varsava, How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for Following
Precedent, 30 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 62 (2018).
15 See, e.g., Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at
1754 (arguing that the Erie doctrine should apply to methods of statutory interpretation);
Foster, supra note 2, at 1870 (arguing that courts should “give stare decisis effect” to
methods of statutory interpretation); Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 294 (1993) (suggesting
that federal methods of statutory and constitutional interpretation represent common law
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judges are entitled to use their own preferred methods of statutory
interpretation, regardless of the body of law they happen to be
interpreting.16 As Professor James Thomas notes, “there are not too
many legal scholars who would take the position that rules and maxims
of statutory construction are legal rules [that bind judges].”17 These
scholars (and the many judges who agree with them) understand
methods of statutory interpretation as “rules of thumb” or elements of
judicial philosophy as opposed to binding norms and insist that judges
could not carry out the judicial function or properly exercise the
judicial power if they were bound to apply methods of statutory
interpretation that they disapprove of.18 The upshot of this position
for the interjurisdictional context is that a law-applying court need not
defer to the statutory interpretive methodology of the law-supplying
jurisdiction.
Some commentators, taking a practical and consequentialist view
of the issue, have suggested that the utility of a method of legal
interpretation depends on details of the dispute that a court has been
asked to resolve—details that will inevitably vary from case to case—
and so methods of statutory interpretation are unlikely to have the
doctrines); Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 2, at 1593 (arguing that “statutory
interpretation methodology does not seem susceptible to the rule-like approach of stare
decisis” (quoting Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1727, 1811 (2010))).
16 See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation in the
Court of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 763 (2017); Criddle & Staszewski, supra note
2, at 1576; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1990).
17 James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction when Legislation is Viewed as a Legal
Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 208 (1966); see also Gluck, supra note 2, at 757 (asserting
that the idea that rules of statutory interpretation have or should have precedential effect
“has been rejected by all federal courts and most scholars”). But see William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2017) (arguing
that interpretive methodology does constitute law).
18 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 367–77, 394 (2005); Gluck, supra note 2, at 756 (observing
that “[a]lmost all jurists and scholars resist the notion that [methods of statutory
interpretation] are ‘law.’ Instead, most contend that these tools, often called ‘canons’ of
interpretation, are ‘rules of thumb’—a legal category that seems to sit in between law and
individual judicial philosophy.”). But see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Eager to Follow:
Methodological Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 99 N.C. L. REV. 101, 126, 129–30 (2020)
(illustrating, through an empirical study of federal court practices, that lower federal courts
generally treat interpretive methods advanced by the Supreme Court as binding; and
suggesting that, although “one can find plenty of statements, from whatever court one likes,
to the effect that canons are merely ‘rules of thumb,’” “[s]uch statements usually mean, in
context, that a canon is not determinative of a proper interpretation but must be
considered in light of other relevant factors,” and thus “such pronouncements do not
undermine the canons’ precedential status”).
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stability that we would expect from binding rules.19 For example,
Professors James Brudney and Lawrence Baum suggest that, because
different circumstances call for different interpretive approaches, “it is
not practicable to allocate degrees of authoritative status to
interpretive resources on a systemic basis.”20
Arguing to the contrary that methods of statutory interpretation
can and should bind judges, and focusing on the federal-state context,
Professor Abbe Gluck maintains that we need an “Erie for the age of
statutes.”21 She does not mean that federal courts adjudicating state
claims ought to apply state statutory law. That was true even before
Erie. The Erie decision brought state judge-made law into the fold of
federal deference.22 Gluck means, rather, that we need an Erie for
methods of statutory interpretation.23 For Gluck, the methods of statutory
interpretation regularly used by courts in some jurisdiction, say the
state of Colorado, belong to the substantive law of Colorado, and any
court tasked with interpreting Colorado statutes ought to apply the
state’s interpretive methods to those statutes. Whereas Gluck suggests
that, as a descriptive matter, federal courts adjudicating state claims
often disregard the states’ interpretive methods, Professor AaronAndrew Bruhl has recently mounted substantial evidence indicating
that federal courts generally do apply state methods of statutory
interpretation to state claims.24
19 See, e.g., Brudney & Baum, supra note 16, at 751–52. Abbe Gluck and Richard
Posner’s recent survey study of federal appellate judges’ perspectives on statutory
interpretation methodology corroborates Brudney and Baum’s central claims. Abbe R.
Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges
on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302–03, 1313–14 (2018) (finding
that most federal appellate judges surveyed favored a pragmatist, common-sense, and
eclectic approach to statutory interpretation, and most judges do not treat interpretive
canons as precedential, but instead as guidelines or tools). But see Bruhl, supra note 18, at
126–32 (arguing that the practices and declarations of lower federal courts indicate that
they see themselves as bound by interpretive canons laid out by the Supreme Court).
20 Brudney & Baum, supra note 16, at 692.
21 See Gluck, supra note 2, at 753; Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note
3, at 1997.
22 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie Court grounded its
decision in the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, section 34, which provides that state law shall
apply to state law claims, “except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States otherwise require or provide.” Id. at 71 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34,
1 Stat. 73, 92). This section of the Federal Judiciary Act comprises the Rules of Decision
Act and has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2021).
23 See, e.g., Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1990–91
(advocating for a conception of statutory interpretation methodology as substantive law and
asserting that “federal courts should apply state statutory interpretation methodology to
state statutory questions”).
24 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Solving Statutory Interpretation’s Erie Problem, 98 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 12–17), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
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Scholars have largely glossed over the analogous intersystemic
deference problem concerning the interpretation of precedents or
judicial decisions.25 Perhaps this is because methods of interpreting
precedent tend to be more elusive than methods of interpreting
statutes and constitutions. Judges often explicitly reflect on methods
of statutory and constitutional interpretation in their opinions as well
as their extra-judicial writings, debate the relative merits of various
methods, and expressly commit to or identify with certain methods
while rejecting others.26 In contrast, judges regularly follow, distinguish, and overrule previous judicial decisions without justifying or
even noting the interpretive choices that they make in the process.
And yet, these interpretive choices are ubiquitous. In almost all
cases, judges are called upon to interpret previous judicial decisions
directly. The same is not true of statutes. Even in cases that implicate
a statute, judges often do not interpret the statutory provisions directly
but instead rely on a previous decision’s interpretation of those
provisions. For this reason, some scholars refer to precedent itself as a
tool, and even “the dominant” tool, of statutory interpretation.27
Bruhl writes that “[t]he overwhelming importance of precedent in the
lower courts today, combined with the rarity of cases of first
impression, has left all other [statutory] interpretive tools . . . with less
of a role to play.”28 In contrast, when it comes to precedent, even if
judges can rely on a more recent decision’s interpretation of some
precedent, they still have to interpret the more recent decision.
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3978040 (citing “published cases from every regional circuit and
the D.C. Circuit stating that state statutes should be interpreted using state interpretive
methods,” and concluding that “federal courts generally understand themselves to be
bound to apply state interpretive methods to state statutes”).
25 See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 2, at 757 (focusing on statutory interpretation); Criddle
& Staszewski, supra note 2, at 1593 (same); Foster, supra note 2, at 1867 (same); Donald H.
Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to
Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1999) (same); Rutherglen, supra
note 2, at 294 (focusing on statutory and constitutional interpretation); Chad M. Oldfather,
Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013) (focusing on constitutional
interpretation).
26 See e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing in
favor of textualism and originalism in statutory and constitutional interpretation).
27 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences
Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 22 (2018) (explaining
that, as “the important questions” raised by a new statute “are answered, precedent
becomes the dominant interpretive tool and many disputes merely require application of
settled law to particular facts”).
28 Id. at 18. Moreover, as Bruhl notes, although “[t]he Court can of course overrule
its precedents . . . stare decisis has particular force in statutory cases.” Id. at 18 n.69.
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To the extent that scholars address the issue of precedential
interpretation in the interjurisdictional context, they generally assume
that whether a court has a duty to apply a body of case law and whether
the court must apply the interpretive methods of the jurisdiction
responsible for that case law are one and the same question.
According to Professor Richard Re, for example, “the [U.S. Supreme]
Court generally lacks authority over interpretation of state court
precedents.”29 Professor Ernest Young similarly asserts that, “if the law
involved is really state law, then it is surely up to the state to determine”
the content and scope that federal courts will afford the state’s
precedents.30 This pervasive assumption is consistent with the version
of Erie that we are taught in law school: a state has authority over its
own substantive law, including decisional law, even when that law is
applied in federal courts. If states have this kind of authority, they must
also have authority to dictate how external courts will interpret their
judicial decisions. On the prevailing view, then, the legal duty to apply
a state’s case law comes with an implicit legal duty to apply the state’s
methods of interpretation to that case law.
But the Court’s decision in Erie specified only that federal judges
must apply state substantive judge-made law. The Judiciary Act, which
the Court interpreted in Erie, provides that “the laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States
or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision . . . in the courts of the United States,” and is likewise
silent on the question of how federal judges are to ascertain and apply
state law.31 Neither the Judiciary Act nor the Erie decision itself reveals
whether federal courts must treat a state’s methods of interpretation
as part of the state’s substantive law. And the Court hasn’t addressed
the issue in subsequent decisions either.
Gluck and others have shown, as a descriptive matter, that federal
courts act inconsistently when they interpret state statutes: sometimes
29 Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1961 (2019); see also
Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87,
97 n.18 (2002) (asserting that “it seems obvious that any court (state or federal) should
apply Marks when construing a U.S. Supreme Court opinion”). For a discussion of the
method of interpreting plurality decisions that the Supreme Court advanced in Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), see infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
30 Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 17, 54 (2013); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 982 (1986) (asserting that Erie “allows each state’s highest court
to be the ultimate arbiter of what state law means and thus defines our notion of what state
law is”); Note, Erie v. Tompkins and Federal Determinants of Place of Trial, 37 IND. L.J. 352,
356 (1962) (stating that “the Erie principle . . . requires not only the application of state law
but a state definition of that law as well”).
31 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2021).
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they defer to state methods of statutory interpretation, sometimes they
apply their own methods, and other times they rely on some
combination of state and federal methods.32 According to Gluck,
courts generally do not approach the question of statutory interpretation as an Erie one: she observes that, “if federal courts understood
[statutory] methodology as [substantive] common law,” then “they
would at least consider Erie when choosing how to interpret state
statutes” but they do not do so.33 As I show in Part II below, courts
seem to approach the intersystemic interpretation of precedent in
much the same way as they do statutes. Gluck and others observe that
we do not have an Erie for statutory interpretation, and they insist that
there is no good reason to single out statutory interpretation for
special treatment.34 But scholars have neglected to appreciate that the
problem of conflicting methods of interpretation also arises in the
context of applying precedent—and we do not have a robust Erie for
precedential interpretation either.
So how do methods of interpretation manage to elude Erie’s
grasp? After all, as Gluck and others have argued at length, there are
good reasons to prefer a system in which any given body of law is
interpreted using a uniform set of interpretive methods, no matter
which court performs the interpretive task. If different courts apply
different methods of interpretation to the same statute or judicial
decision, then the legal effect of the source of law—the rights and
duties it represents—might differ depending on which court happens
to interpret it.35 Although you could predict which body of substantive

32 See, e.g., Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1933; Suzanna
Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 129, 141 (2011) (observing that some federal courts adjudicating state claims employ
the state’s methods of statutory interpretation whereas others do not).
33 Gluck, supra note 2, at 787.
34 See Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1847–
48 (asserting that statutory interpretation should be no different from other types of
interpretation and that “[a]s a matter of interpretive theory, this distinction [between
methods of statutory interpretation and other types of interpretation] remains
unjustified—or perhaps just unnoticed—in the legisprudence and the literature”); Gluck,
Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1898 (asserting that “[f]ederal courts
routinely bypass state interpretive principles when they interpret state statutes, but almost
always look to other state methodological principles”); Gluck, supra note 2, at 808
(suggesting that “[m]uch more work would have to be done to justify creating a special
exception for statutory interpretation, while [affording legal status to] analogous
interpretive . . . rules”).
35 See, e.g., Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1914, 1962
(suggesting that judicial resistance to treating methods of statutory interpretation as
binding law that travels with first-order rules of decision enables unacceptable disuniformity
in the application of law); see also Foster, supra note 2, at 1888 (appealing to “rule-of-law
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law will apply to you—for example, if you are in conducting your affairs
in Wisconsin, then Wisconsin state law will likely apply—you might not
be able to predict whether your lawsuit will be adjudicated by a state or
federal court. In turn, even assuming that you have familiarized
yourself with Wisconsin law, you might not be able to predict the legal
effect that it will have on your dispute. This lack of predictability would
appear to be problematic for rule-of-law reasons.36
As I will argue, however, whether one believes that methods of
interpretation are interjurisdictionally binding in a given case depends
on one’s theory of law. And, under at least two prominent legal
theories—Hart’s positivism and Dworkin’s law as integrity—judges
operating in the intersystemic setting are not necessarily bound by the
interpretive methods of the law-supplying courts.
After presenting a descriptive account of intersystemic stare
decisis in Part II, in Part III I take up the problem from a
jurisprudential point of view. I develop a novel theory of interpretation in the intersystemic setting, which reveals the conditions that have
to obtain for a jurisdiction’s doctrine of stare decisis to be binding on
judges operating outside that jurisdiction.
C. Conflicting Methods of Interpreting Precedent
In this section I discuss some of the most salient ways in which
precedential interpretation can vary: (1) how broadly judicial decisions
are construed; (2) how the number of judges who voted for the
judgment of a case affects the case’s force as a precedent; and (3) how,
if at all, fractured decisions are binding. This list is nonexhaustive,
however; doctrines of stare decisis can differ in other respects as well,
including the status afforded unpublished decisions,37 advisory
opinions,38 and the syllabi of decisions.39
and coordination” considerations to argue that statutory interpretive methods should have
legal status and should be subject to Erie).
36 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) (explaining how “the cluster of considerations concerned with
predictability occupies a prominent place both in justifications of stare decisis and in various
conceptions of the rule of law”).
37 See infra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
38 For example, from the perspective of Michigan state courts, “advisory opinions are
not precedent.” In re Apportionment of Wayne Cnty., Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs–1982, 321
N.W.2d 615, 626 (Mich. 1982). And state courts generally “characterize advisory opinions
as [technically] nonbinding,” even though they often treat them as precedential. Lucas
Moench, Note, State Court Advisory Opinions: Implications for Legislative Power and Prerogatives,
97 B.U. L. REV. 2243, 2266 (2017). An exception is Colorado, where the state Supreme
Court has held that its advisory opinions constitute binding precedent. Id. at 2266 n.135.
39 For example, whereas the syllabi of U.S. Supreme Court decisions are not
authoritative, Ohio courts have historically treated only the syllabi of Ohio Supreme Court

2022]

STARE DECISIS AND INTERSYSTEMIC ADJUDICATION

1221

1. Scope
First, methods differ in terms of scope—that is, courts can
interpret precedents more or less broadly.40 On a broad approach, a
court might determine that all or most legal propositions that a court
articulates in a majority opinion are binding on subsequent cases, even
propositions tangential to the precedent case’s outcome. The traditional approach, though, is a narrower one, where only propositions
integral to the outcome of a case make for binding law.41 Another way
of putting the point is that courts can draw the line between dicta and
holdings differently, with some taking a more restrictive approach to
holdings and others a more capacious one. To the extent that courts
take differing approaches to precedential scope, and mounting
empirical evidence suggests that they do, the question of whether
methods of interpretation travel with substantive case law is of
widespread consequence.42

decisions as precedential (unless the court issues a per curiam opinion, in which case that
is binding as well). For a discussion of the Ohio rule, see William M. Richman & William
L. Reynolds, The Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
313, 323 n.71 (“At various points in its history, the syllabus rule seems to have been adopted
as a rule of court or simply as case law. [The syllabus rule] also seems to draw some support
from OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2503.20.”).
40 Professor Randy J. Kozel discusses the matter of scope in depth in The Scope of
Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2014).
41 Some courts purport to treat all “considered statements” contained in opinions
issued by higher courts as binding law, whereas other courts subscribe to narrower views of
vertical precedent. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2026
& nn.106–07 (1994) (presenting examples of U.S. federal courts that have differing views
regarding precedential scope); see also Kozel, supra note 40, at 198 (observing that “[m]any
lower courts have described Supreme Court statements as entitled to deference even when
those statements were made in dicta” and that “[t]he strength of deference varies from
court to court”). Kozel suggests, though, that currently the federal courts widely embrace
“an inclusive paradigm of [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent in which binding effect attaches
to a vast array of judicial propositions” and that this paradigm is in tension with “the more
restrictive definition of precedent that is implied by the classic holding–dicta distinction.”
Id. at 183, 199. Charles Tyler finds that some courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, have adopted what he calls an “adjudicative model of precedent”: on this model,
which apparently expands the traditional scope of precedent, “any ruling expressly
resolving an issue that was part of the case” is binding on subsequent cases, even if the
outcome of the case did not turn on that issue. Charles W. Tyler, The Adjudicative Model of
Precedent, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1551, 1551, 1554 (2020).
42 See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 41, at 1575–84 (presenting empirical evidence to suggest
that some courts take a systematically broader approach to precedent than others). See
also infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text, for an example in which the U.S. Supreme
Court used its own approach to the holding/dicta distinction to interpret a state case.
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2. Voting
For many jurisdictions, a decision of the highest court has
precedential effect so long as a majority of participating judges agreed
on the judgment.43 Michigan courts, for example, take this position,
as do U.S. federal courts.44 In some jurisdictions, however, it seems
that a decision can only create precedent if a majority of the whole court
agrees on the judgment. In North Carolina, with a Supreme Court
comprised of seven justices, if less than a majority of that court agrees
on a decision to affirm or reverse the North Carolina Court of
Appeals—even if a majority of sitting Justices so agrees—then the
Court of Appeals decision is automatically affirmed and the Supreme
Court decision apparently does not carry precedential effect.45

43 For an excellent analysis of the relationship between voting rules and precedent,
see Jonathan Remy Nash, The Majority That Wasn’t: Stare Decisis, Majority Rule, and the Mischief
of Quorum Requirements, 58 EMORY L.J. 831 (2009).
44 See, e.g., Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W.2d 98, 99–100 (Mich. 1976) (observing that
“[w]ere we to hold that 3–2 or 3–1 decisions are not binding on the Court of Appeals and
trial courts, the functioning of our judicial system would be adversely affected” and holding
that, “lower courts [are] bound by majority decisions of this Court of less than four
justices”); see also Nash, supra note 43, at 833–37 (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court
treats, for purposes of precedent, cases decided by a majority of the sitting justices but less
than a majority of the whole court, which he calls “minority-majority” decisions). Since the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has set a floor on the number of U.S. Supreme Court justices
required to decide a case, and the quorum since 1911 has been six. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2021);
see also Nash, supra note 43, at 843–44 (documenting how Supreme Court quorum
requirements have changed over time). However, Congress has not prescribed
methodological rules for stare decisis. Some commentators have suggested that such
legislative directives would violate separation of powers principles. See Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
570, 588, 596 (2001) (suggesting that stare decisis represents “an authorized aspect of the
‘judicial Power’ conferred by Article III” and accordingly “deserves recognition as a
legitimate, constitutionally authorized doctrine beyond Congress’s power to control”).
45 See Nw. Bank v. Roseman, 354 S.E.2d 238, 238 (N.C. 1987) (per curiam) (asserting
that, since only five members of the court participated in the decision and they divided 3-2
on all issues, there thus “being no majority of the Court voting to either affirm or reverse,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is left undisturbed”); Costner v. A.A. Ramsey & Sons,
Inc., 351 S.E.2d 299, 299 (N.C. 1987) (per curiam) (same)). The North Carolina Supreme
Court asserted in both of these cases that, since a majority of the Court could not agree on
any of the issues, the lower court decision stood “without precedential value.” Id.; Roseman,
354 S.E.2d at 238. However, in subsequent cases both state and federal courts have
seemingly disregarded the latter point. See, e.g., Flanary v. Wilkerson, No. COA10–1401,
2011 WL 5540195, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2011) (treating the North Carolina Court
of Appeals decision in Roseman no differently for the purposes of precedent than Court of
Appeals decisions that were not reviewed by the Supreme Court); Clark v. B.H. Holland
Co., 852 F. Supp. 1268, 1278–79 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (same). Nash argues that courts should
afford “minority-majority” decisions limited and narrow precedential effect. Nash, supra
note 43, at 888.
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3. Fractured Decisions
Most state and federal courts treat at least some types of plurality
decisions as binding, but the methods that courts employ for this
purpose differ considerably.46 The U.S. Supreme Court has advanced
multiple methods of following plurality decisions. In Marks v. United
States, the Court announced that, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’”47 What exactly “narrowest grounds” means is not
important for our purposes here.48 In later cases—for example Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction and United States v.
Jacobsen—the Court advanced a different view of the precedential
effect of plurality decisions, suggesting that dissenting opinions count
and majority agreement at the level of rationale or principle
establishes binding norms.49
The federal circuits have failed to converge on any single
approach to the interpretation of plurality decisions. Although a
majority of the circuits now employ the Marks rule at least some of the
time, they understand its prescriptions differently.50 Some circuit

46 A plurality decision is a decision with no majority opinion, and a plurality opinion is
the opinion in a plurality decision that received the most votes of all opinions concurring
in the judgment of the court.
47 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). In Marks, the
Court had the task of construing the plurality decision of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966). Marks, 430 U.S. at 190.
48 For diverse perspectives on the meaning and merit of the Marks rule, see Re, supra
note 29; Maxwell Stearns, Modeling Narrowest Grounds, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2021);
Nina Varsava, The Role of Dissents in the Formation of Precedent, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 285, 299–305 (2019); Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and
Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795 (2017).
49 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)
(taking reasons endorsed by the concurrence and dissent in Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437
U.S. 655, 667 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring), id. at 668 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), as
controlling); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115–16 (1984) (suggesting that
agreement between the lead and dissenting opinions in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649,
657 (1980) (opinion of Stevens, J.), id. at 663–64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), is
authoritative).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1015 (11th Cir. 2017), rev’d on other
grounds, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2018) (applying Marks to Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S.
522 (2011), and determining that Freeman’s concurrence of one represents the binding
opinion); United States v. Rivera-Martínez, 665 F.3d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 2011) (same); United
States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (determining that Freeman
contains no narrowest view that would be binding under Marks); United States v. Epps, 707
F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (same). The current Supreme Court Justices also disagree
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courts take methodological guidance from cases where the Supreme
Court has included dissents in the precedent calculus,51 while others
cite Marks to support the claim that dissents cannot count for the
purposes of precedent.52 Still others at least sometimes treat the plurality opinion as authoritative, apparently simply because it attracted the
most votes of the opinions that agreed with the judgment.53 In the next
Section, I discuss an example of an important case that federal and
state courts have construed differently as a result of different
approaches to stare decisis.
D. Illustration
The Supreme Court case of Kirby v. Illinois54 addressed whether a
criminal suspect who has been arrested and confronted with the crime
victim for identification purposes (at a police station “show-up”), but
not yet indicted, has a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment;
and whether, if the suspect was deprived of that right, testimony
related to the eyewitness identification must be excluded from the
trial.55 When Thomas Kirby and a friend were stopped by police
officers on the street and asked for identification, Kirby produced the
wallet of one Willie Shard.56 The officers arrested the men and
brought them to the police station, at which point the officers learned
that Shard had reported that he had been robbed.57 Shard came to
the station and identified Kirby and his friend as the assailants.58
Neither of the suspects had lawyers, nor had they been informed of a
on the meaning of the Marks rule, a disagreement on display in the recent case of Ramos v.
Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). For a discussion, see Varsava, supra note 1.
51 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying the
dissent-inclusive method to Supreme Court precedent); Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d
256, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2015) (same); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552–53 (9th Cir.
2005) (same); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1578–79 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (same).
52 See, e.g., United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209 (6th Cir. 2009) (asserting that
the “‘narrowest’ opinion refers to the one which relies on the ‘least’ doctrinally ‘farreaching-common ground’ among the Justices in the majority”) (emphasis added); King v.
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783–84 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
53 See, e.g., In re Kozeny, 236 F.3d 615, 620–21 (10th Cir. 2000) (treating the view
expressed in the plurality opinion of Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), as the
holding of the case, even though the concurrence and dissent in Will agreed on a different
view and both disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning); Sexton v. Kennedy, 523 F.2d 1311,
1314 (6th Cir. 1975) (treating the plurality opinion from Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974), as controlling).
54 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
55 Id. at 684 (plurality opinion).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 684–85.
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right to counsel.59 Kirby was convicted in Illinois state court and
appealed—ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court—on the grounds that
he had been denied his constitutional right to counsel and that
evidence regarding the identification event should have accordingly
been excluded from the trial.60
The Supreme Court issued a 4–1–(3)–(1) decision. (Parentheses
signify dissenting votes.) Justice Stewart wrote the plurality opinion,
determining that, under the relevant precedent, an individual does
not have the right to assistance of counsel until he has been indicted
and that, therefore, admitting testimony from an identification event
that occurred prior to indictment did not violate the Sixth
Amendment.61 Chief Justice Burger joined the plurality opinion in
full, but wrote separately to emphasize that “the right to counsel
attaches as soon as criminal charges are formally made against an
accused.”62 Justice Powell concurred in the judgment only and wrote
a one-line opinion explaining that his agreement was based on the
exclusionary rule; he did not express any opinion on the right to
counsel question (i.e., whether defendants have such a right before
being indicted).63 Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which
he applied the reasoning of prior Supreme Court decisions,
determined that Kirby had a right to counsel during the preindictment confrontation, and concluded that evidence regarding the
confrontation thus should have been excluded.64 Justice White wrote
a separate dissent, which simply listed previous cases that he
understood to govern the present one and to necessitate a decision in
favor of the defendant.65
Following the Court’s decision in Kirby, multiple federal courts
treated Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion as controlling and cited it to
support the claim that criminal defendants do not have a right to
counsel before being indicted.66 From the point of view of some states,

59 Id. at 685.
60 Id. at 686–87.
61 Id. at 688–90.
62 Id. at 691 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
63 See id. (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
64 Id. at 692–705 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 705 (White, J., dissenting).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 1983) (“The sixth
amendment affords the right of counsel in all criminal prosecutions,” and “[t]his right
attaches ‘[a]t or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’”
(quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion))); United States v. Harrison, 213 F.3d
1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attaches ‘at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
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though, Kirby never represented an authoritative source of federal law
on the right to counsel question. Michigan courts, for example, take
a principle from a judicial decision as binding only if a majority of the
court agreed “on a ground for decision.”67 As the Michigan Supreme
Court has explained, “[i]f there is merely a majority for a particular
result, then the parties to the case are bound by the judgment but the
case is not authority beyond the immediate parties.”68 In keeping with
this approach to precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court declined to
follow Kirby on the right to assistance of counsel, and even asserted that
it was “not permitted to follow Kirby as authoritative precedent” in that
regard.69
In general, federal courts have been much more amenable than
Michigan ones to treating propositions from plurality opinions as
authoritative. Kirby, then, has a different legal meaning from the
perspective of Michigan courts than at least some federal ones. From
Michigan’s point of view, Kirby had no effect on the law concerning the
right to counsel. For example, consider the Michigan case of People v.
Anderson. A rape victim was asked to identify her assailant on multiple
occasions, but the accused was not provided with counsel or informed
of a right to counsel during this pre-indictment period.70 Based on its
reading of other cases, which aligned with the understanding of the
main dissenting opinion in Kirby, the Michigan Supreme Court
determined that the accused had a right to counsel under federal law
prior to indictment.71 For at least some federal courts, however, Kirby’s
arraignment.’” (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion))); United States v. Percy,
250 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 2001) (same).
67 People v. Anderson, 205 N.W.2d 461, 467 (Mich. 1973), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Hickman, 684 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. 2004) (asserting that “[t]he clear rule in
Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a ground for decision in order to
make that binding precedent for future cases”); see also People v. Ackley, No. 336063, 2021
WL 1150195, at *2 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2021) (“In cases where there is no majority
opinion, any proposition or reasoning agreed to by a majority of the Justices, in any
combination, is binding precedent as to that narrow point of agreement.”).
68 Anderson, 205 N.W.2d at 467.
69 Id. (declaring that “[s]ince there is no agreement by a majority of the United States
Supreme Court regarding the limitation of right to counsel in Kirby, we are not permitted
to follow Kirby as authoritative precedent on the question of counsel”). In support of this
proposition, the Michigan Supreme Court asserted that it represents “[t]he clear rule in
Michigan” and cited six Michigan state cases as well as the legal encyclopedia Michigan Law
& Practices (and “cases cited [therein]”). Id. The court did state that “[t]he same rules of
decision govern the permissible construction by states of decisions of the United States
Supreme Court[,]” but to support that proposition it relied on United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 216 (1942), where the U.S. Supreme Court declared that decisions by an equally
divided Court are not binding precedent without addressing plurality decisions. Anderson,
205 N.W.2d at 467.
70 Anderson, 205 N.W.2d at 463–66.
71 Id. at 465–76.
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plurality opinion was authoritative; for those courts, the decision
provided that defendants do not have a right to counsel until judicial
criminal proceedings have been initiated.
The question of whether a law-applying court ought to apply the
substantive precedent of a law-supplying jurisdiction is conceptually
distinct from the question of whether that court ought to apply the lawsupplying jurisdiction’s stare decisis jurisprudence. As the case of Kirby
illustrates, these questions come apart in practice too. In the next Part,
I show that Kirby is not an anomaly in this regard. Courts often proceed
as though they are bound by the precedent of another jurisdiction
without deferring to the other jurisdiction’s doctrine of precedent.
II.

INTERSYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION IN PRACTICE

In practice, judges sometimes follow their own or their own
jurisdiction’s interpretive approach to precedent, even when judges in
the law-supplying jurisdiction take a different approach, and they do
not seem to feel a need to explain or justify that course of action.
Other times judges do defer to the interpretive approach of the lawsupplying jurisdiction, even when it differs from the approach they
would apply to their own jurisdiction’s law. My review of federal and
state judicial practices in the concurrent jurisdiction context suggests
that federal courts adjudicating state claims often do not defer to state
methods of interpreting case law. State courts are more deferential to
federal interpretive methods than federal courts are to state ones, but
in many cases state courts apply their own stare decisis doctrines no
matter which body of law they are interpreting. In this Part, I focus on
a few states to illuminate the range of federal and state court
approaches to the interjurisdictional interpretation of precedent.
A. Federal Courts Interpreting State Cases
Federal courts applying state law often disregard state stare decisis
doctrines entirely. Michigan provides an especially stark example.
Michigan state courts have been relatively explicit and steadfast, since
the 1970s at least, in their approach to the interpretation of plurality
decisions. Under the state’s prevailing norm, precedent-bound courts
search for majority agreement at the level of principle or rationale
across all opinions of the precedent case and treat any such agreement
(and only that) as authoritative.72 But federal courts nevertheless

72 See Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Mich. 1976) (“Plurality decisions in which
no majority of the justices participating agree as to the reasoning are not an authoritative
interpretation binding on this Court under the doctrine of stare decisis.”); Nat. Aggregates
Corp. v. Brighton Twp., 539 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (asserting that, if “a
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disregard this approach, even when seeking the precedential import
of Michigan plurality decisions—a task that the Sixth Circuit has
confronted on many occasions.73 Sixth Circuit courts sometimes treat
the plurality opinions of these decisions as authoritative without any
special explanation or justification, even though those opinions do not
enjoy precedential status under Michigan’s own stare decisis
jurisprudence.74
It is unclear whether the federal courts ignore Michigan’s
approach intentionally or out of ignorance. If a litigant were to make

majority of justices [does] not concur with the reasoning of [an] opinion,” then that
opinion “is not binding precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis” (citing Negri, 244
N.W.2d at 100)); Liquia v. Antler Bar Amusements, LLC, No. 348087, 2020 WL 4381870, at
*5 (Mich. Ct. App. July 30, 2020) (asserting that “we are not bound by plurality decisions of
our Supreme Court where no majority of the justices participating concur in the reasoning”
(citing Negri, 244 N.W.2d at 100)); see also supra note 67. The question directly before the
court in Negri was whether “lower courts [are] bound by majority decisions of [the Michigan
Supreme Court] of less than four justices[,]” which it answered affirmatively, but the case
has come to be known in Michigan for its discussion of the precedential status of plurality
decisions. Negri, 244 N.W.2d at 100.
73 I have not been able to find any federal cases that recognize Michigan’s norm about
the precedential effect of plurality decisions. I conducted the following targeted Westlaw
searches on September 5, 2021: “Negri” AND “Michigan law”; “397 Mich. 105” AND
“Michigan law”; “Negri” AND “plurality”; “397 Mich. 105” AND “plurality.” I searched for
references to Negri because Michigan courts often cite that case for its propositions about
the precedential status of plurality decisions. These searches turned up two federal cases
citing Negri, one (In re Newpower, 229 B.R. 691, 697–98 (W.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 233 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2000)), regarding the precedential effect of closely
divided (3–2) decisions and the other (Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 850 F. Supp.
1342, 1345 (W.D. Mich. 1993)) regarding the precedential effect of equally divided
decisions. I also searched for federal court citations to People v. Anderson, cited supra note
67, but did not find any federal cases citing Anderson on the construction of plurality
decisions. In a study focusing on the methods of statutory interpretation that Sixth Circuit
courts apply to Michigan state statutes, J. Stephen Tagert likewise found that very few of the
federal decisions applying Michigan statutes cite a Michigan statutory methodology case,
and he determined that federal courts generally do not follow Michigan’s methods of
statutory interpretation. J. Stephen Tagert, Note, To Erie or Not to Erie: Do Federal Courts
Follow State Statutory Interpretation Methodologies?, 66 DUKE L.J. 211, 217, 257 (2016).
Although federal courts do not seem interested in Michigan’s approach to the precedential
effect of plurality decisions, the two cases citing Negri do indicate that some federal courts
are open to applying at least some elements of Michigan’s stare decisis doctrine.
74 Compare Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“The test under Michigan law for determining whether an ordinance is reasonable
requires an assessment of the existence of a rational relationship between the exercise of
police power and the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare in a particular manner
in a given case.” (citing Square Lake Hills Condo. Ass’n v. Bloomfield Twp., 471 N.W.2d
321, 324 (Mich. 1991))), with Nat. Aggregates Corp., 539 N.W.2d at 767 (“We note that a
majority of justices did not concur with the reasoning of Justice Riley’s opinion in Square
Lake, and that the Riley opinion thus, is not binding precedent under the doctrine of stare
decisis.” (citing Negri, 244 N.W.2d at 100)).
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an argument in federal court that relies on Michigan’s rule for
construing plurality decisions, that would provide a good test case.
Accordingly, I searched Westlaw for litigant briefs filed in the Sixth
Circuit for references to that rule. The search turned up one result:
an appellee brief arguing that a Michigan plurality decision that the
appellant relied on is not binding under Michigan law, given the state’s
understanding of the precedential effect of plurality decisions.75 The
case was ultimately dismissed and settled through mediation, however,
so we do not know what the Court of Appeals made or would have
made of the point.
When dealing with federal plurality decisions, Sixth Circuit courts
have applied the Marks narrowest grounds rule on multiple occasions.
But they have also noted the limitations of the rule and its
inapplicability to certain cases.76 Sixth Circuit courts have sometimes
simply treated plurality opinions of federal decisions as controlling
without any explanation, just as they have done with Michigan plurality
opinions.77
Sometimes federal courts apply stare decisis methodology
advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court to state decisions. In a case
concerning Alabama law, for example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals used the Marks rule to interpret a plurality decision from the
Alabama Supreme Court. The federal court analyzed the overlap
between the plurality opinion and two concurring justices in the state
decision, and concluded that the position of the concurring justices is
authoritative, since it represents “the narrowest grounds” for the
decision under Marks v. United States.78 Alabama courts, however, do
not apply the narrowest grounds approach to their own decisions and
75 UFS’s Corrected Appellee Brief at 40–41, Secura Ins. v. DTE Gas Servs. Co., No. 151321 (6th Cir. July 15, 2015).
76 United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 209 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where no standard
put forth in a concurring opinion is a logical subset of another concurring opinion (or
opinions) that, together, would equal five votes, Marks breaks down.”); United States v. Ray,
803 F.3d 244, 272 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Because . . . the plurality and dissent each received only
four votes, we conclude that [Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004),] did not announce a
binding rule of law.”).
77 See, e.g., In re Payton, No. 00-5204, 2000 WL 572056, at *2 (6th Cir. May 1, 2000)
(relying on the plurality opinion from Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662 (1978));
Halliburton v. United States, 59 F. App’x 55, 57 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); Sexton v. Kennedy,
523 F.2d 1311, 1314 (6th Cir. 1975) (relying on the plurality opinion from Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
78 Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1188 & n.2 (11th Cir.
2004). The Court of Appeals in this case was interpreting a decision that the Alabama
Supreme Court had issued in response to a certified question. This example shows that the
certification process, even if it were always available as an option (which it isn’t), would not
resolve the problem of conflicting methods of interpretation. Even when federal courts
certify questions to state courts, they have to interpret the state decisions issued in response.
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would be unlikely to find authority where the federal court found it in
this case.79
Some federal courts at least some of the time do defer to state
norms of constructing plurality decisions. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, for example, has followed Pennsylvania’s approach,
determining that a particular plurality case “does not represent a
majority view” and is therefore “not considered controlling precedent
under Pennsylvania law.”80 But such examples of federal judicial
decisionmaking seem to be relatively rare.
Although I focus here on interpretive methodology for plurality
decisions, stare decisis doctrines vary across jurisdictions in other ways
too, raising the same kind of questions about intersystemic deference.
For a particularly salient example, consider how Louisiana, unlike
other jurisdictions in the U.S., does not treat judicial interpretations of
statutes as binding sources of law.81 This difference seems to affect how
federal courts treat Louisiana cases when deciding questions arising
under the state’s law. In disputes involving the interpretation of
Louisiana state legislation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals maintains
that it is “guided by decisions rendered by the Louisiana appellate
courts,” but is “not strictly bound by them.”82
The holding/dicta distinction presents another opportunity for
law-applying courts to defer, or not, to the law-supplying jurisdiction’s
approach to stare decisis. Whenever a court interprets a judicial
decision for the purposes of precedent, even if the decision has a

79 Ex parte Disc. Foods, Inc., 789 So. 2d 842, 845 (Ala. 2001) (asserting that “[t]he
precedential value of the reasoning in a plurality opinion is questionable at best”); Ex parte
Achenbach, 783 So. 2d 4, 7 (Ala. 2000) (same). I searched Alabama state court decisions
for citations to Marks, and all of the cases citing it for the narrowest grounds rule concern
the construction of federal plurality decisions, except for one in which a concurring justice,
writing only for himself, suggested that the Marks rule should be applied to the Alabama
case at issue. E.W. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 872 So. 2d 167, 173 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003) (Crawley, J., concurring specially). Judge Crawley’s claim was explicitly rejected in
the majority opinion. Id. at 170 (majority opinion).
80 Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 F.2d 327, 333 (3d Cir. 1992).
81 See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th
Cir. 1992) (observing that “[t]he concept of stare decisis is foreign to the Civil Law, including
Louisiana”).
82 Id. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s deference to Louisiana on the matter of
interpretation, see Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 713
(1995). Gluck relies exclusively on this example to support the claim that courts
understand stare decisis practices as substantive law and that federal courts defer to state
interpretive practices under Erie. Gluck, supra note 2, at 796 n.158. Louisiana represents a
special case, however, and we should be wary of extrapolating too much from it. The state
is anomalous in the U.S. insofar as it is a civil law jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit might
be inclined to defer to Louisiana methodologically because of the fundamental differences
between civil and common-law systems.
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majority opinion, the court has to sort holdings from dicta. Federal
courts seem to rely on their own approach to doing so even when
dealing with questions of state law, apparently without second
thought.83 For example, as Professor Michael Dorf recounts, in Carroll
v. Lessee of Carroll,84 the Supreme Court “invoked the principles
applicable to construing the scope of its own holdings in deciding
whether to treat language in a state [Maryland] court opinion as
holding or dictum.”85 The Court acknowledged that it had a duty to
apply the Maryland decision,86 but then appealed to its own norms for
separating holdings from dicta in order to ascertain the precedential
effect of that decision. The Justices looked to previous Supreme Court
decisions—decisions concerning the interpretation of federal
precedent—for principles that would guide their interpretation of the
state precedent at issue. The Court observed that it “has never held
itself bound by any part of an opinion, in any case, which was not
needful to the ascertainment of the right or title in question between
the parties.”87 The Justices concluded that, accordingly, they would
not treat the portion of the state opinion at issue as binding, since the
norms articulated there were dicta under the Court’s own stare decisis
jurisprudence.
B. State Courts Interpreting Federal Cases
When state courts adjudicate federal claims, some of them at least
some of the time apply federal doctrines of stare decisis to federal
cases. For example, on numerous occasions state courts have applied
the Marks rule to federal plurality decisions.88 Some states employ a

83 See Dorf, supra note 41, at 2001 n.16 (noting that “the United States Supreme Court
does not distinguish between state and federal courts in its attempts to separate dicta from
holdings”).
84 57 U.S. (11 How.) 275 (1853).
85 Dorf, supra note 41, at 2001 n.16 (emphasis omitted). In another article, Dorf
observes that federal courts treat the question of how to ascertain state law as a federal
question. See Dorf, supra note 82, at 710.
86 Carroll, 57 U.S. at 286 (explaining that “the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary
Act, (1 Statutes at Large, 92,) . . . makes the laws of the several States the rules of decision
in trials at the common law; and inasmuch as the States have committed to their respective
judiciaries the power to construe and fix the meaning of the statutes passed by their
legislatures, this court has taken such constructions as part of the law of the State, and has
administered the law as thus construed”).
87 Id. at 287. The Court went on to quote Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia
and to declare that expressions in a judicial opinion that “go beyond the case . . . may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point
is presented.” Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)).
88 See, e.g., Callihan v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Ky. 2004) (applying the
Marks rule to Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), and concluding that Justice Kennedy’s
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version of the Marks rule that accords with their own internal
understanding of the precedential status of plurality decisions. For
example, even when Michigan courts cite Marks (which they appear to
have done only once in the context of interpreting a federal plurality
decision), they look for majority agreement across all opinions in the
plurality decision—just as they would do if Marks was out of the picture
and they were dealing with a Michigan state plurality decision.89
Michigan courts have also explicitly applied Michigan’s own stare
decisis doctrine to questions of federal law, ignoring Marks entirely.
For example, in People v. Perlos, the Michigan Court of Appeals
maintained that, despite the defendants’ contention that “we are not
bound by a plurality decision of the United States Supreme Court,”
“[w]e find that we are so bound.”90 The Michigan court did not appeal
to any federal authority for this claim, but instead cited a Michigan
case.91
Some state courts have rejected or simply ignored Marks when
constructing federal plurality decisions. The Georgia Supreme Court
declined to apply the Marks rule to a U.S. Supreme Court case based
on its determination that “it would not be useful” to do so when the
apparent narrowest grounds view of the case was endorsed by only one
Justice, even though federal courts do treat single-Justice opinions as
binding under Marks when those opinions represent the narrowest

concurring opinion represents Seibert’s holding, since his opinion set forth “the narrowest
grounds” for the judgment); In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar–
Advert., 971 So. 2d 763, 766–67 (Fla. 2007) (applying Marks to Peel v. Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), and concluding that Justice Marshall’s
concurrence represents the Peel holding, as the narrowest opinion that concurred in the
judgment); State v. Griep, 863 N.W.2d 567, 579 & n.16 (Wis. 2015) (asserting that Marks
excludes consideration of dissenting opinions and concluding accordingly that the
concurrence-dissent alignment of Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), is not controlling).
89 I searched on Westlaw for Michigan state decisions citing Marks v. United States and
reviewed the twelve results. The only case concerning the construction of a federal plurality
decision determined that “the more limited holding” on which “a majority of the United
States Supreme Court agreed . . . is binding law” and cited Marks to support this conclusion.
Long Lake Twp. v. Maxon, No. 349230, 2021 WL 1047366, at *5 & n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar.
18, 2021).
90 People v. Perlos, 442 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that, although
“[t]he defendants have argued that we are not bound by a plurality decision of the United
States Supreme Court,” “[w]e find that we are so bound,” and citing the Michigan case of
Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. 1976), as the only authority to support that claim),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 462 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1990).
91 Perlos, 442 N.W.2d at 735; see also People v. Bell, 702 N.W.2d 128, 147 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the Michigan case of Negri governs the construction of federal
plurality decisions), opinion corrected on reh’g, 704 N.W.2d 69 (Mich. 2005).
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grounds for the decision.92 The Georgia court went on to assert,
without further justification, that instead of following the narrowest
view presented in the case, it would “consider the analysis presented in
the plurality opinion to be that mandated by the United States
Supreme Court.”93
Some state courts in at least some cases follow the plurality
opinions of federal plurality decisions as if they were normal majority
opinions, without citing any authority to support the approach.94
Other state courts have used a dissent-inclusive method to interpret
federal plurality decisions, without appealing to federal authority to
support the approach. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has included dissenting opinions in its analysis of federal precedent in
an effort to reach the conclusion that the precedent-setting court
would have reached if it were deciding the case presented.95 In doing
so, the Pennsylvania court offered only the conclusory justification that
its “analysis is based simply on a fair reading of each of the [opinions
issued in the precedent case].”96
92 State v. Pye, 653 S.E.2d 450, 453 n.6 (Ga. 2007) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 325 (2003), regarding the limitations of Marks). For a list of federal decisions treating
single-Justice opinions as binding under Marks, see Varsava, supra note 1, at 122 n.24.
93 Pye, 653 S.E.2d at 453 n.6.
94 For example, some states have treated the plurality opinion of Will v. Calvert Fire
Ins., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), as controlling. See, e.g., Clark v. Sullivan, No. 110,394, 2014 WL
4627587 at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2014); In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 539 A.2d
664, 687 (Md. 1988), disapproved of by State v. Manck, 870 A.2d 196, 207 (Md. 2005). State
courts have done the same with the plurality opinion of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277
(2004) (plurality opinion). See, e.g., Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman,
731 N.W.2d 164, 176 (Neb. 2007); Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 377 (Colo. 2009) (en
banc); Wilson v. Fallin, 262 P.3d 741, 749 (Okla. 2011).
95 Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57, 60–61 (Pa. 1986) (applying the reasoning
of each opinion issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in the plurality decision of Baldasar v.
Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
96 Id. at 60–61 & n.10 (“Viewing the facts of [Baldasar] in light of [its] concurring and
dissenting opinions, it is clear that appellants’ claims must fail” since “a majority of the
Supreme Court [would reject them].”). The Pennsylvania Court noted that “[t]he opinions
in Baldasar do not lend themselves to an application of the ‘narrowest grounds’ test,” that
“[t]he Supreme Court has never explained what constitutes ‘narrow grounds,’” and that “it
is not apparent from a reading of the opinions in Baldasar that any of them is narrower than
the others.” Id. at 60 n.10. As Professor Maxwell Stearns has shown, supra note 48, at 210,
Pennsylvania courts sometimes use the Marks narrowest grounds rule on their own
decisions. However, they are not consistent in this practice; and they have expressed a
commitment to a strict majority-agreement approach with respect to both federal and state
plurality decisions, in which a plurality decision is binding only to the extent that a majority
of the court agreed on some legal propositions. See, e.g., Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d
273, 278 (Pa. 1998) (asserting that, it is “permissible to find that a Justice’s opinion which
stands for the ‘narrowest grounds’ is precedential, but only where those ‘narrowest
grounds’ are a sub-set of ideas expressed by a majority of other members of the Court” and
“[t]he mere finding that one Justice expressed a narrower belief than others does not
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In similar fashion, in its effort to interpret the U.S. Supreme Court
case of Medtronic v. Lohr,97 the Texas Supreme Court announced that
it would take rationales that were endorsed by a majority of Justices as
authoritative, even though those Justices parted ways on the judgment.98 To justify this approach, the Texas justices simply asserted that
they “believe [they] should treat as authoritative the matters on which
[the majority of Justices] agree.”99
The Illinois Supreme Court has perhaps been more explicit than
any other state court in denying the force of Marks over its own
decisionmaking, even in the adjudication of federal questions. That
court has directly asserted that only federal courts are bound by the
Marks method of interpreting plurality decisions, and it has
accordingly declined to apply Marks to a U.S. Supreme Court decision
despite multiple federal court decisions having done so.100
*

*

*

Courts in the U.S., then, often proceed as though they are entitled
and even obligated to apply their own stare decisis jurisprudence to
the judicial decisions of other jurisdictions. Federal courts deciding
questions of state law seem only rarely to take up state methods of
interpreting precedent. And in many cases, state courts likewise apply

dispense with the requirement that a majority of the Court need agree on a concept before
that concept can be treated as binding precedent”), rev’d, 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
97 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
98 Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 967 S.W.2d 360, 368 (Tex. 1998).
99 Id. (asserting that “we believe we should treat as authoritative the matters on which
Justice Breyer and Justice O’Connor agree,” even though they “do not concur fully in the
judgment”). The California Supreme Court took the same tack in Sandquist v. Lebo Auto.,
Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 511 (Cal. 2016) (treating a point of agreement between the lead and
dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court plurality decision of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,
539 U.S. 444 (2003), as authoritative).
100 People v. Gutman, 959 N.E.2d 621, 627–28 (Ill. 2011) (asserting that, whereas the
federal courts must follow Justice Stevens’s concurrence in United States v. Santos, 553 U.S.
507, 526 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring), as the narrowest grounds opinion under Marks,
as a state court it was under no duty itself to “attempt to apply [that opinion]”). Oddly,
some state courts have suggested that they believe themselves to be bound by Marks not
only in the interpretation of federal decisions but also state ones. See, e.g., Morgan v. City
of Ruleville, 627 So. 2d 275, 278 (Miss. 1993) (suggesting that the Marks narrowest grounds
rule is general “settled jurisprudence”); State v. Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d 362, 373 (Wis.
2013); Crocker v. Roethling, 675 S.E.2d 625, 635 & n.1 (N.C. 2009); Tomczak v. Bailey, 578
N.W.2d 166, 183 (Wis. 1998) (Crooks, J., concurring) (“I assert that the opinion of this
court in Makos is of precedential value, and that its legal authority should be determined in
accord with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marks.”). Perhaps some judges
implicitly take the interpretation of precedent to be governed by general common law or
universal legal principles and believe that the federal Supreme Court has special insight
into or expertise in such general law.
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their own interpretive approaches to federal judicial decisions.
Neither federal nor state courts, however, have offered a compelling
theoretical justification for their lack of deference to the stare decisis
doctrine of a law-supplying jurisdiction.
In the next Part, I show how our answer to the question of whether
and when methods of interpreting precedent are intersystemically
binding depends on our theory of law. My theoretical account
explains how judges charged with interpreting another jurisdiction’s
case law might sometimes be legally permitted and even obligated to
reject that jurisdiction’s interpretive methods.
III.

INTERSYSTEMIC INTERPRETATION IN THEORY

This Part first shows that, if we analyze stare decisis doctrine under
the substance-versus-procedure framework of Erie, it would count as
substantive rather than procedural law. If stare decisis doctrine is
substantive for Erie purposes, then a federal court applying state law
has a legal duty to apply the state’s doctrines of stare decisis, including
its methods of interpreting precedent. I next argue, however, that
stare decisis jurisprudence eludes the Erie framework—that is, the Erie
doctrine is not applicable to it. This is the case even if a jurisdiction’s
own judges believe that their methods of interpreting precedent
constitute binding norms under their own law. Whether a law-applying
judge is bound by the interpretive methods of the law-supplying
jurisdiction depends on the nature of those methods and their
relationship to the rest of the jurisdiction’s law. The question depends
further on the nature of law itself: we might disagree on whether
methods of interpreting precedent are intersystemically binding in a
given case, then, because we subscribe to different theories of law. And
so disagreements about intersystemic interpretive deference, I suggest,
are indicative of more fundamental jurisprudential conflicts.
As I will show, for neither a positivist nor a Dworkinian is stare
decisis doctrine unconditionally binding in the intersystemic context.
I suggest further that under a positivist theory of law, a law-applying
court is more likely to be bound by the stare decisis methodology of
the law-supplying jurisdiction than under law as integrity. Another way
to put the point is that a judge’s departure from the stare decisis
methodology of the law-supplying jurisdiction in a given case is more
likely to be justifiable under law as integrity than under positivism.
Given the multiple plausible and competing theories of law on offer,
including but not limited to positivism and law as integrity, the
enduring disagreement among scholars and judges about the status of
interpretive methodology in intersystemic adjudication is no wonder.
This Part of the Article sheds new light on that disagreement, revealing
the theoretical assumptions that underlie the arguments on either side
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and illuminating the terms of the debate at the most fundamental
level.
A. Substance versus Procedure
Considerations including predictability, uniformity, fairness, and
state autonomy or sovereignty motivated the Supreme Court in Erie to
expand the power of state courts over state law.101 The Erie doctrine
provides that federal courts adjudicating state claims are to apply state
substantive law, including judge-made law, but federal procedural
law.102 While the Erie doctrine concerns adjudication in federal courts,
what has come to be known as “reverse-Erie” applies to adjudication in
state courts: it provides that, when those courts decide questions of
federal law, they must apply federal substantive law, including federal
precedent, but are free to use state procedural rules.103
On the one hand, as a second-order concern about how a court
makes its decisions, stare decisis would seem to be procedural for the
purposes of an Erie analysis and accordingly under the authority of the
forum jurisdiction. Indeed, commentators sometimes classify stare
decisis as procedural law.104 On the other hand, though, the approach
that a court takes to stare decisis determines the first-order substantive
rights that past decisions represent, which suggests that methods of
following precedent are properly viewed as substantive for Erie
purposes, regardless of whether they are “procedural” in some
technical or conventional sense.
101 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine
Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1237
(1999) (noting that reasons including “uniformity of outcome,” “predictability,” “fairness
to the parties,” and “federalism” underlie the Erie doctrine); Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide
to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 964–74 (2013) (discussing
and critiquing the uniformity, fairness, and federalism considerations that Justice Brandeis
appealed to in Erie’s majority opinion); Joshua P. Zoffer, Note, An Avoidance Canon for Erie:
Using Federalism to Resolve Shady Grove’s Conflicts Analysis Problem, 128 YALE L.J. 482, 543
(2018) (recognizing Erie’s “goals of federalism and uniformity”); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S.
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 374 (1980)
(noting the “fairness value” underlying Erie); Bruhl, supra note 24 (manuscript at 29–30)
(explaining that the Erie doctrine “is rooted, at least in part, on concern for state
sovereignty”).
102 Erie questions arise in cases of diversity jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2021) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over diversity cases); id.
§ 1367 (granting federal courts “supplemental” jurisdiction over certain state claims).
103 See supra note 6.
104 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 823–24
(2008) (discussing stare decisis as an example of procedural common law and suggesting
that it is “conventionally treated as ‘procedural’”); John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over
the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 511–12 (2000) (describing rules of precedent as
“part of the internal operating procedures of the courts”).
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Distinguishing substance from procedure has proven to be a tricky
business, and the Supreme Court has attempted to offer guidance
across a series of cases. The outcome-determination test of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York directs federal courts to consider whether a federal
rule that is ostensibly procedural would “significantly affect the result
of a litigation.”105 If the rule would so affect the result, then the federal
court should refrain from applying it and should use the state
alternative instead. According to the Court in Guaranty Trust, “the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same [as the outcome in state court], so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation.”106
In subsequent decisions, though, the Court has recognized
difficulties with the outcome-determination test of Guaranty Trust;
these decisions emphasize certain principles underlying Erie and
elaborate the outcome-determination test with those principles in
mind. The Court asserted in Hanna v. Plumer that “[t]he ‘outcomedetermination’ test . . . cannot be read without reference to the twin
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”107 The result has
been a more complicated and elusive, but perhaps also more
justifiable, approach to distinguishing procedure from substance.
In addition to the fairness or equal treatment objective,
uniformity in application of a given body of law is meant to serve
reliance interests—“reduc[ing] the costly complexity that arises from
legal heterogeneity[,] and facilitat[ing] nationwide planning across
states and other subjurisdictions.”108 According to the classic casebook
Hart and Wechsler’s the Federal Courts and the Federal System, Erie represents the Court’s response to “the problems of conflicting applications
of common law principles”: “the rules by which [people] are to be

105 Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). For subsequent cases taking up the
outcome-determination test, see, for example, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356
U.S. 525, 536–37 (1958) (asserting that “cases following Erie have evinced a broader policy
to the effect that the federal courts should conform as near as may be—in the absence of
other considerations—to state rules even of form and mode where the state rules may bear
substantially on the question whether the litigation would come out one way in the federal
court and another way in the state court if the federal court failed to apply a particular local
rule”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465–66 (1965) (observing that Guaranty Trust “made
it clear that Erie-type problems were not to be solved by reference to any traditional or
common-sense substance-procedure distinction”).
106 326 U.S. at 109; see also Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir. 1940)
(observing that “it is unfair and unseemly to have the outcome of litigation substantially
affected by the fortuitous existence of diversity of citizenship”).
107 380 U.S. at 468.
108 Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 945
(2016).
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judged” are not supposed to “depend upon the unpredictable
circumstance of what court they can get into, or may be haled into.”109
Further, Erie stands for the idea that, in areas under legitimate
state control, state officials (whether legislators or judges) are supposed to have exclusive authority to determine the rules of conduct to
which people are subject. The Erie decision was meant to protect and
expand state sovereignty by recognizing that states are entitled to
define rights and duties under state law not only through statutory and
constitutional provisions, but also by way of judicial decisions.
The methods that courts use to interpret case law determine the
rules of decision that cases represent, and accordingly the substantive
rights and duties that litigants have under those cases. As Bruhl
explains in his discussion of intersystemic statutory interpretation, the
question of whether a court operating in the intersystemic context
understands itself as bound by the interpretive approach of the lawsupplying jurisdiction is “not merely of theoretical interest, as case
outcomes can change depending on the governing rules.”110 This goes
for methods of precedential interpretation just as well as those of
statutory interpretation.
Imagine that a federal court sitting in diversity and adjudicating a
claim arising under Kentucky law applies the Marks narrowest grounds
rule to a Kentucky plurality decision.111 Let’s say that the narrowest
view represented in that decision would grant relief to the plaintiff in
the present case. The federal court, then, following the Kentucky
decision, would rule in favor of the plaintiff. Kentucky courts, though,
do not give precedential effect to plurality decisions.112 From
Kentucky’s point of view, then, the state right that the federal court
would grant the plaintiff might not exist. Accordingly, a plaintiff in
federal court might be afforded rights that an otherwise identically
situated plaintiff in state court would be denied, even if both plaintiffs
brought their claims under the same body of law.
In sum, viewed within the Erie framework, stare decisis doctrine
would seem to be a better candidate for substance than for
procedure.113 If stare decisis doctrine was substantive law for Erie
109 FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 580–81.
110 Bruhl, supra note 24 (manuscript at 3–4).
111 See supra subsection I.C.3 for a discussion of the Marks rule.
112 See, e.g., Ware v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Ky. 2001) (asserting that “[a]
minority opinion has no binding precedential value . . . [and] if a majority of the court
agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a majority could agree on the reasoning for
that decision, the decision has no stare decisis effect” (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 159
(1995) (current version at 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 134 (West 2021)))); see also Fugate v.
Commonwealth, 62 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Ky. 2001) (quoting Ware, 47 S.W.3d at 335).
113 For the same kinds of reasons, Gluck argues that “many, if not all, rules of statutory
interpretation” ought to be taken as “substantive” for Erie purposes. Gluck, Intersystemic
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purposes, then federal courts would be bound by state methods of
interpretation when construing state judicial decisions.
In the next Section, however, I explain why we should not end our
inquiry with the Erie analysis. The Erie framework is meant to resolve
questions about whether some state judicial practice is best understood
as substantive or procedural law. But Erie does not address the
preliminary matter of whether some state practice constitutes a legally
binding norm in the first place. Nor does it make space for the
possibility that the authoritative status of a practice may depend not
only on which body of law is under interpretation but also on
characteristics of the interpreting body. The next Sections elaborate
the different conditions under which stare decisis doctrine will be
intersystemically binding under two prominent theories of law.
B. Interpretive Methodology and Theories of Law
Methods of legal interpretation are correct to the extent that they
correctly identify and ascertain what the law prescribes.114 But whether
an interpretive method does accurately identify the law’s prescriptions
depends on how the law itself is constituted.115 A claim about which
methods of interpretation are the proper ones, then, presupposes the
truth of some theory or conception of law.116 This proposition should
not be mysterious or surprising. After all, a claim that some
interpretive method is correct or appropriate amounts to a claim that
the method is an effective means of making out the content of the
law;117 if an interpretive method is effective in that way, it must be
faithful to that which constitutes the law. As Professor Mark Greenberg

Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1924. See also Bruhl, supra note 24 (manuscript at
35) (suggesting that “methods of statutory interpretation come closer to the substance pole
than the procedure pole”).
114 See Mark Greenberg, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal
Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105, 106 (2017) (arguing that
“what makes a method of legal interpretation correct is that it accurately identifies the
law”); see also Pojanowski, supra note 2, at 514–21 (pointing out that one’s approach to
statutory interpretation is parasitic on one’s “beliefs about the nature of law”).
115 Greenberg, supra note 114, at 107–12.
116 Mark Greenberg, Principles of Legal Interpretation 22 (2016) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Principles-ofLegal-Interpretation-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVA6-GZHB] (discussing how “[t]he
way in which the content of law is determined at the most fundamental level is a
controversial issue in the philosophy of law”).
117 Following Greenberg, I take “content of the law” to refer to “all of the legal
obligations, powers, and so on in a given jurisdiction at a given time.” Mark Greenberg,
The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1295 (2014).
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puts it, “an account of how to figure out the properties of particular
Xs must be appropriately based on what Xs are.”118
The question of how law is constituted, though, is a fundamental
and unsettled question in legal philosophy, which legal theories such
as positivism, law as integrity, and natural law theories attempt to
answer.119 For example, consider Greenberg’s own Moral Impact
Theory of Law. On that theory, it is in the nature of law itself “that a
legal system is supposed to change our moral obligations in order to
improve our moral situation.”120 If the Moral Impact Theory is correct
as a theory of law, then the correct method of precedential
interpretation would seek to ascertain the impact that a judicial
decision has had on the moral obligations of the people subject to the
jurisdiction’s law.121 A method of interpretation with that aim, and so
a correct method of interpretation according to the Moral Impact
Theory, will not necessarily coincide with a correct method of
interpretation according to an alternative theory, which understands
the content of law differently. Another way to put the point is that the
method(s) of interpretation that will be successful on Greenberg’s
theory of law may well differ from the method(s) that will be successful
on an alternative theory of law, such as positivism.122 A particular
method of interpretation, then, might be justified or correct under
one theory of law but not others.
Returning to the intersystemic setting, then, a given jurisdiction’s
judges might use a set of interpretive methods that is not connected in
the right way to the content of law as some plausible legal theory—call
it theory θ—envisions it. According to θ, then, the jurisdiction’s
interpretive methods might not yield the correct legal rules or
standards to apply in a given case, and so might not yield the correct
legal answer either. In the event that external judges are charged with
applying the jurisdiction’s law, and those judges subscribe to θ as their

118 Greenberg, supra note 116, at 12.
119 See id. at 22–24.
120 Greenberg, supra note 117, at 1294.
121 See id. at 1293.
122 As Greenberg himself notes, “prominent accounts of how the content of the law is
determined in fact have extremely different implications for legal interpretation.”
Greenberg, supra note 116, at 23. It is certainly possible, however, that judges committed
to different theories of law will agree, and likewise that judges committed to the same theory
will disagree, on interpretive methodology. As Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule argue, even judges with different theoretical commitments might “converge on”
an interpretive approach; and a single approach might be best under diverse theories of
law, given empirical realities including “institutional facts about judges’ capacities.” Cass
R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 889,
909 (2003).
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theory of law, then they will have good reason not to apply the
interpretive methods of the law-supplying courts.
H.L.A. Hart’s positivism and Ronald Dworkin’s law as integrity
represent two of the most prominent contemporary theories of law.123
And Dworkin is widely seen as Hart’s main “antagonist,” advancing a
forceful alternative to Hart’s highly influential view.124 Jurisprudential
theories of this sort are concerned with the very nature of law: they try
to answer the question of what law is or how it is constituted.125 At the
same time, they offer solutions to the closely related question of how
adjudicators are to make out the content of the law. Positivism and law
as integrity call for different approaches to ascertaining the legal rights
and duties that exist in a given jurisdiction.126 These theories, as I will
explain, accordingly generate different answers to the question of
whether and when stare decisis doctrine is intersystemically binding.127

123 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 116, at 18 (suggesting that Hart’s version of
positivism is “the most widely held theory of law” today); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication
as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 365 (1997) (describing Dworkin’s theory of law as
integrity as “one of the most influential extant theories of adjudication”).
124 ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 27 (2006) (“Ronald Dworkin is often taken to be H.L.A. Hart’s
antagonist, urging an approach that Dworkin calls ‘integrity,’ meant to be an alternative to
Hart’s form of positivism.”); see also Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the
Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 623 (1987) (noting that Hart’s account has faced
challenges, “most notably by Ronald Dworkin”).
125 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 145 (2006) (observing that he and
Hart “are in the same boat” in an important respect, since “both believe that [they] will
understand legal practice and phenomena better if [they] undertake to study, not law in
some particular manifestation . . . but the very concept of law”).
126 Id. (explaining that he and Hart advance different theories of “how law is to be
identified”).
127 In an article arguing that state methods of interpreting state statutes should diverge
from federal methods of interpreting federal statutes because of the greater common-law
powers of state courts, Professor Jeffrey Pojanowski begins to make progress on the problem
of interjurisdictional statutory interpretation as well. Pojanowski, supra note 2, at 540–41.
Although he does not develop his position on this front in any detail, he does provocatively
suggest that “the intersystemic question may turn on the theorist’s standpoint regarding
the nature of interpretation and law,” and that a positivist interpreter can perhaps “treat
another jurisdiction’s interpretive method as binding,” whereas a Dworkinian “may argue
that a faithful interpreter has no choice but to read any statute in light of background
purposes and the best reading of that community’s principles of political morality.” Id. at
540. For reasons that I elaborate in the next two Sections, I believe that Pojanowski’s
suggestion here is roughly right, although positivism will sometimes allow and sometimes
even require a judge’s interpretive methods to differ from those practiced in the lawsupplying jurisdiction and law as integrity will sometimes require a judge to apply the
methods of the law-supplying jurisdiction. Gluck also observes, in passing, a connection
between the question of interjurisdictional interpretive deference and the nature of law.
She suggests that, if we view law “positivistically” (which she seems to take for granted is the
dominant and correct view), then a law-applying court should apply the interpretive
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If you believe, with Hart, that a valid legal rule in a given
jurisdiction is one that meets the conditions of the jurisdiction’s rule
of recognition—which is a social or conventional rule—then a judge
applying a foreign jurisdiction’s law will generally be bound by the
interpretive practices of the foreign jurisdiction’s judges. If you believe
instead, with Dworkin, that the correct answer to a legal dispute is the
one that follows from the principles that best fit and justify the lawsupplying jurisdiction’s entire body of judicial decisions, statutes, and
the like, then a judge may or may not have a duty to follow the
interpretive methods of the foreign judges in any given case. The
existence of such a duty would depend on whether the methods in
question were necessary for the judge to achieve the feat of fit and
justification that law as integrity demands.
In the next Sections, I take up these two competing theories of
law—positivism and law as integrity—in turn, to show how they
generate different answers to questions of intersystemic interpretation.
I do not take a position on which, if either, of these legal theories is
correct, but wish only to show how our position on the binding effect
of stare decisis jurisprudence in the intersystemic setting ultimately
and inevitably depends on our theory of law.128

practices of judges in the law-supplying jurisdiction. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1901–02, 1978, 1988. Gluck does not elaborate in any detail,
however, on the relationship between the intersystemic interpretation problem on the one
side and theories of law on the other.
128 Note also that I do not make any all-things-considered claims about the methods of
interpretation that a court should apply when deciding a question that arises under the law
of another jurisdiction. There are, after all, many reasons why judges might be permitted
or even required to defy their legal obligations—the most obvious one being that the law
requires a morally objectionable decision. It is possible that in a given case a court
ultimately should not defer to the methods of interpretation that courts in the law-supplying
jurisdiction would use, even if the court is legally obligated to so defer. And, even if
deference is not legally required in a given case, a court might have another kind of
obligation to defer. For example, such deference might be critical to the perceived
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking, which judges might have a duty to protect. Professor
Anuj Desai makes this kind of point in response to Bruhl’s proposal that courts at different
levels within a judicial hierarchy should, for institutional reasons including epistemic ones,
use different methods of statutory interpretation. Anuj C. Desai, Heterogeneity, Legislative
History, and the Costs of Litigation: A Brief Comment on Bruhl’s “Hierarchy and Heterogeneity”, 3
WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 16 (2013) (suggesting that “telling lower federal courts to interpret
statutes differently from the Supreme Court would contradict the common American
conception of what courts do, something that might . . . undermine confidence in the
courts”); see also Bruhl, supra note 2, at 470 (arguing that, since “[d]ifferent courts have
different competencies and capacities,” “[t]he best approach for one court, with its
particular strengths and weaknesses, might not be the best approach for another”). For the
purposes of this Article, I focus on the intersystemic context and set aside the related
question of whether a lower court in a judicial hierarchy is bound by the interpretive
practices of the apex court in that hierarchy.
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C. Positivism
For legal positivists, legal systems have rules of recognition, which
are “secondary rules” that delineate the criteria of validity for legal
rules of conduct or “primary rules”:129 a primary rule is valid (and so
an actual legal rule in the system) if and only if it satisfies these criteria
of validity.130 A rule of recognition itself is a social or conventional rule,
which exists only if a society’s legal officials in fact practice and accept
it.131 This means that (1) the society’s officials conform to the rule, as
evidenced by their behavior, (2) they feel or perceive an obligation to
follow the rule, and (3) “the general conformity” to the rule among
the society’s officials is one of the reasons that the officials have for
following it.132 The latter two conditions capture the internal attitude
or point of view. As Professor Scott Shapiro explains, “[t]he internal
point of view is the practical attitude of rule acceptance”: “people who
accept the rule[] . . . are disposed to guide and evaluate [their]
conduct in accordance with [it].”133
The rule of recognition in a legal system provides a test of validity
for the system’s primary rules; it provides “authoritative criteria for
identifying primary rules of obligation.”134 But “there is no rule
providing criteria for the assessment of [the rule of recognition’s] own
legal validity.”135 The rule of recognition is foundational in that sense.
For example, the British rule of recognition provides that “what the
Queen in Parliament enacts is law.”136 We know that this is a rule of
recognition because it “provides criteria for the assessment of the
validity of other rules”; unlike those other rules, “there is no rule
providing criteria for the assessment of its own legal validity”; and U.K.
officials—those charged with applying U.K. law—in fact treat whatever
the Queen enacts as law and understand themselves and one another
as obligated to do so at least in part because doing so is customary or
conventional.137

129 Note that there may be intermediate secondary rules between the rule of
recognition and primary rules of conduct. For more on this, see infra note 140.
130 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 103 (2d ed. 1994).
131 See id. at 110, 250, 256.
132 See id. at 101, 117, 255–58.
133 Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1157
(2006).
134 HART, supra note 130, at 100.
135 Id. at 107.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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1. Stare Decisis as Rule of Recognition
Let’s return to the example of precedent and plurality decisions.
As we saw above in Part II, in some jurisdictions, legal officials—
judges—have converged on particular methods of construing plurality
decisions. And, in some instances, judges have converged on these
methods not merely as a matter of practice or habit, but also as a matter
of obligation to a shared practice. Such norms for interpreting plurality decisions constitute a doctrine of stare decisis (or are part of a
broader doctrine of stare decisis). The interpretive rule for plurality
decisions supplies criteria for the identification of primary legal rules,
specifically for evaluating the legal validity of principles and
propositions contained in judicial decisions, and thus forms part of a
jurisdiction’s rule of recognition.138 Rules for separating holdings
from dicta supply further conditions of legal validity (and represent
another part of stare decisis doctrine) since judges follow these rules
to determine which parts of a judicial opinion constitute legally
binding norms and which do not.
Let’s take Michigan as an example. Michigan courts look for
majority agreement on principle or rationale across all opinions issued
in the plurality decision, including dissents, and treat majorityendorsed principles as binding. And Michigan judges follow this
approach as a conventional norm: they proceed as though they have
an obligation to follow it, an obligation that is at least in part constituted by the fact that they and other judges have done so in the past.139
Michigan’s interpretive approach for plurality decisions belongs to the
state’s rule of recognition. As Hart explained, the rule of recognition
is “constituted by the uniform practice of the courts in accepting it as
a guide to their law-applying and law-enforcing operations.”140
138 See JOSEPH RAZ, Law and Value in Adjudication, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS
LAW AND MORALITY 180, 184 n.8 (1979) (noting that “the doctrine of precedent” is
“part of the rule of recognition”). Methods of statutory interpretation have likewise been
understood to “provide criteria for identifying legal rules, and [to] belong to the category
of ‘secondary rules’ of the legal system, to which H L A Hart assigns what he terms ‘rules of
recognition.’” CROSS, supra note 9, at 42.
139 See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 205 N.W.2d 461, 467 (Mich. 1973) (stating that “[t]he
clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a ground for decision
in order to make that binding precedent for future cases”), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Hickman, 684 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. 2004); Soufane v. Wu, No. 279227, 2009 WL
3789979, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2009) (asserting that “a decision of four or more of
our [seven] Supreme Court justices on a specific point of law is binding upon this Court
with regard to that point of law”).
140 HART, supra note 130, at 258. As other scholars have stressed, the rule of
recognition supplies criteria of validity not only for primary rules or rules of conduct, but
also for other secondary rules, which might in turn supply criteria of validity for primary
rules. See JOSEPH RAZ, The Identity of Legal Systems, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
ON
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In contrast to Michigan, Kentucky courts do not count dissenting
views for the purposes of precedent and do not take themselves to be
bound by true plurality decisions.141 Kentucky’s rule of recognition,
then—in particular its test for determining the legally-binding effect
of previous judicial decisions—differs from Michigan’s. It is unclear
whether Kentucky affords no binding effect to plurality decisions as a
rule or only as a practice. But we can tell from the behavior of
Kentucky judges that, in contrast to Michigan, they do not have a
doctrine of precedent that would require them to treat components of
plurality decisions as binding law. To this extent at least, the states
have different tests of legal validity and so different rules of
recognition.
We can now turn to the context of an outside court—for example
a federal court—adjudicating a claim arising under a state’s law. Let’s
start with Michigan. The federal court has a legal duty to apply the
substantive law of Michigan, including judge-made law. Assuming that
the federal court wishes to fulfill its legal duty, should it follow
Michigan’s interpretive methods? Insofar as Michigan’s legal officials
have converged on and accept some interpretive approach as a rule,
then the federal court should follow that approach.142 This is because
Michigan’s interpretive approach comprises key tests of legal validity
LAW AND MORALITY 78, 95 (1979) (explaining how it is not only the rule of recognition, but
also other laws that can “set criteria of validity”); see also Brian Leiter, Critical Remarks on
Shapiro’s Legality and the “Grounding Turn” in Recent Jurisprudence, 17 (Sept. 16, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3700513. Interpretive methods will
sometimes take the form of secondary rules distinct from rules of recognition; some
interpretive method might be a valid legal rule if it is established, for example, by a statute
or judicial decision that is itself binding under the rule of recognition. A judicial decision
might set out some method of interpretation that constitutes a valid law just because the
state’s rule of recognition provides that judicial decisions are themselves binding law. In
that case, the method would be a secondary rule as opposed to part of the jurisdiction’s rule
of recognition. I set aside this technical distinction for the purposes of my analysis here. It
is relevant to the situation I am addressing only, I believe, in the following sense. Whereas
the rule of recognition is a valid legal rule only if it is in fact followed by a jurisdiction’s legal
officials, derivative rules do not come with this condition and are valid just in virtue of the
rule of recognition. If a particular method of interpretation is a secondary but derivative
rule in this sense and not part of the jurisdiction’s rule of recognition—which is arguably
true of Michigan’s Negri rule as well as the federal Marks rule—then a law-applying court
might be legally bound by the method of interpretation even if the jurisdiction’s own judges
neglected to follow it.
141 See, e.g., Ware v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.3d 333, 335 (Ky. 2001) (declaring that a
decision without a majority opinion “has no stare decisis effect” (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Courts § 159 (1995) (current version at 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 134 (West 2021)))).
142 If the judges treat some method of interpretation as “simply [a] tradition[] of good
practice,” or rule of thumb, however, as opposed to an obligatory norm, the method would
not constitute part of the rule of recognition and law-applying judges would not be bound
by it. CROSS, supra note 9, at 40.
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for the jurisdiction of Michigan. If federal courts apply some other
approach to Michigan’s plurality decisions—for example, one that
takes the plurality opinion as binding, which they have in fact
done143—then they will inaccurately identify certain norms as binding
that are not actually binding under Michigan’s rule of recognition and
will fail to identify certain binding norms as such. In this respect, the
federal court’s approach to ascertaining legal rules of conduct, as
applied to Michigan precedent, would result in both false positives and
false negatives.
What about Kentucky, then? Based on Kentucky’s approach to
plurality decisions, as demonstrated in Kentucky judicial opinions that
address those decisions, we can tell that Kentucky’s rule of recognition
does not require judges to find legally valid rules in plurality decisions.
What is unclear is whether judges are nevertheless permitted to do so.
As long as Kentucky’s rule of recognition does not prohibit plurality
decisions from serving as precedent, the rule leaves judges with
discretion over the construction of plurality decisions. This would be
an instance of what Hart called law’s “open texture.”144 If the law is
open textured with respect to a particular dispute, then it does not
supply a singularly correct answer to the legal question presented. In
this event, a judge’s decision will not be fully determined by preexisting legal norms, and she must exercise discretion in deciding
which rules to apply and conclusion to reach.
If Kentucky judges are exercising their discretion when they
choose not to follow plurality decisions as precedent, then there is no
legally binding rule on the matter, and federal judges deciding
questions of Kentucky law would also have discretion. If the past
Kentucky case that most closely resembles the present dispute was
decided by a plurality decision, then the federal judges might decline
to follow the plurality decision—perhaps for the sake of consistency,
since that is what Kentucky judges would likely do—or they might
decide to rely on the Kentucky plurality decision in one way or another,
which would serve consistency on another level. Under Hartian
positivism, either of those approaches would be legally permissible.145

143 See supra notes Section II.A.
144 See HART, supra note 130, at 124–36 (explaining how both statutory and
precedential rules are open-textured, and describing the discretion of judges in light of this
open texture).
145 As Hart explained, a judge’s discretion in light of law’s open texture “may be very
wide; so that if [the judge] applies [a particular rule], the conclusion, even though it may
not be arbitrary or irrational, is in effect a choice.” Id. at 127.
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2. Indeterminacy
Another possibility is that the federal rule of recognition requires
federal judges to apply a particular method of interpretation in the
event of a gap in the state’s law. We know that federal courts, under
Erie—so as a matter of federal law—have a legal duty to apply state
substantive law to state disputes. The Erie decision itself did not resolve
the question of how a federal court is supposed to proceed in the event
that state law on an issue is indeterminate. But subsequent cases
indicate that federal courts deciding questions of state law do not
necessarily have discretion wherever their state counterparts would:
this is a matter of federal conflict of laws jurisprudence. Federal courts
generally take themselves as legally obligated to apply their best
prediction of how a state’s courts would decide the case at hand or will
decide similar cases.146 This prediction doctrine is part of the federal
rule of recognition in the context of deciding questions of state law,
even if it is not part of any state’s rule of recognition for ascertaining
its own law. Under positivism, then, interpretive methods between the
law-supplying and law-applying jurisdictions can come apart when the
law of the law-supplying jurisdiction is indeterminate.
3. Mistakes
For positivists, law is, at bottom, a product of the social rules that
a jurisdiction’s legal officials practice and accept.147 For this reason, a
court interpreting another jurisdiction’s law has to follow the social
rules—which can include interpretive methods—of the jurisdiction’s
judges, as if those rules were its own. Under positivism, then, judges
do not have the kind of interpretive autonomy that would permit them
to ignore or reject the interpretive norms of a law-supplying
jurisdiction.
A jurisdiction’s judges might on occasion, however, incorrectly
attribute legal validity to some rules that are actually invalid under
their own jurisdiction’s rule of recognition and they might likewise fail
to recognize the legal validity of certain rules. Legal officials are fallible actors—a reality that positivism accommodates. As Hart explained,
“[n]o rules can be guaranteed against breach or repudiation; for it is
never psychologically or physically impossible for human beings to
146 See, e.g., Becker v. Interstate Props., 569 F.2d 1203, 1205 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Inasmuch
as no New Jersey cases are squarely on point, it is important to make clear that our
disposition of this case must be governed by a prediction of what a New Jersey court would
do if confronted with the facts before us.”); Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862,
866 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Where no controlling state decision exists, the federal court must
attempt to predict what the state’s highest court would do.”).
147 See supra Section III.C.
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break or repudiate them.”148 For example, Michigan courts might
from time to time treat plurality opinions from fractured Michigan
decisions as controlling, which would violate Michigan’s rule of
recognition and would likely result in mistaken judgments. As long as
this type of conduct was sporadic or relatively anomalous, then
Michigan’s rule of recognition requiring majority support for the
creation of valid precedent would survive it and federal courts trying
to ascertain Michigan law should not try to reproduce it.149 And so
even under positivism, federal judges adjudicating a state dispute
should not simply try to mimic what their counterparts in the relevant
state’s courts would do.
Chronic, systemic interpretive errors, however, are impossible
under positivism, provided that interpretive methods are part of the
rule of recognition.150 This is because the existence of a rule of recognition requires that officials in fact follow it. Once officials customarily
fail to recognize the rule, it no longer exists.151 If a jurisdiction’s courts
make enough mistakes under some rule of recognition, then, the rule
of recognition will change. This kind of change in a jurisdiction’s rule
of recognition may be difficult for external courts to detect, but they
should nevertheless be on the lookout for such a change if they wish
to get the jurisdiction’s law right.
In sum, under Hartian positivism, a court seeking to identify the
legal rules of a foreign jurisdiction should inquire into the actual
interpretive behavior and attitudes of legal officials in that jurisdiction.
To the extent that the jurisdiction’s legal officials have converged on
some interpretive norms, which the officials follow in order to
ascertain the legally valid rules that past judicial decisions represent,
the law-applying court ought to follow those norms as well—if, that is,
it wishes to correctly ascertain the foreign jurisdiction’s law.152
148 HART, supra note 130, at 146.
149 See id. at 116 (explaining that “[i]ndividual courts of the system though they may,
on occasion, deviate from [the system’s rule of recognition] must, in general, be critically
concerned with such deviations as lapses from standards, which are essentially common or
public”).
150 For a qualification, see id. at 258.
151 See id. at 146; see also Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1138, 1152 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)) (“A Rule of Recognition is a social rule meaning that, at a
minimum, it is constituted by social facts about how officials (i.e., judges) decide questions
about what the law is”; this means “that there can not be too great a gap between what the
law is in a particular society and how judges decide cases, for the very idea of ‘what the law
is’ is (for positivism) conceptually dependent on the actual practice of officials (including
judges) in deciding ‘what the law is.’”).
152 This is not to say that it would be impossible for a law-applying court to get a foreign
jurisdiction’s law right under positivism without attending to that jurisdiction’s interpretive
norms. After all, many jurisdictions follow overlapping interpretive norms—so that, for
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D. Law as Integrity
According to Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, judges arrive at
the right answer to legal questions through the process of constructive
interpretation, which aims to construct a jurisdiction’s whole body of law
such that it is both coherent and justified. “According to law as
integrity,” Dworkin explained, “propositions of law are true if they
figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and
procedural due process that provide the best constructive
interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”153 For Dworkin, a
judge must follow law as integrity as a general or high-level interpretive
approach so long as the pre-interpretive legal materials in a jurisdiction are not so incoherent or unjust that a constructive interpretation
is impossible.154
1. Constructive Interpretation and Stare Decisis
A jurisdiction’s own judges might be wrong about what their law
requires in a given case for any number of reasons, including flaws in
their doctrines of stare decisis. To the extent that the judges of some
jurisdiction—say the state of Iowa—employ interpretive methods that
generate principles and propositions that do not provide the best
constructive interpretations of Iowa’s legal practices, external judges
tasked with applying Iowa law will have no obligation to follow—and
will even have an obligation not to follow—Iowa’s interpretive
methodology.
Under law as integrity, a judge should certainly take the lawsupplying jurisdiction’s prevailing doctrines of precedent into
account. This is because doing so might help the judge to interpret
the law in a way that is consistent with the jurisdiction’s legal practices,
or to recognize and enforce principles that are embedded in those
practices. If, for example, a jurisdiction widely embraces a system of
precedent under which majority agreement among judges is necessary
example, a federal court applying a federal interpretive method might get a state’s law right
because the state uses the same interpretive method. Moreover, sometimes different
interpretive methods will yield the same legally valid rules. For example, take a plurality
decision in which the plurality opinion endorses some key principle, p, that a dissenting
opinion also endorses. As long as the judges joining the plurality and dissenting opinions
comprise a majority of the court, then an interpreter that treats key principles from the
plurality opinion as binding and an interpreter that treats only majority-endorsed principles
as binding will each find that principle p is a legally valid one, even though the interpreters
took different paths to get there.
153 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986).
154 For example, Dworkin suggests that the Nazis had law only in a pre-interpretive
sense, because there is no conceivable interpretation of Nazi legal practices that has “any
justifying power at all.” Id. at 101–02.
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to establish a legally binding rule, then a Dworkinian judge interpreting that jurisdiction’s law will aim to make decisions that are consistent
with that majoritarian principle.155 According to law as integrity,
“[i]ndividuals have a right to the consistent enforcement of the
principles upon which their institutions rely.”156 If, however, a jurisdiction embraces a principle of majoritarian decisionmaking, but its
courts also engage in some interpretive practice that conflicts with this
principle and cannot be redeemed under others—for example, it
treats plurality opinions or “narrowest grounds” opinions from
fractured decisions as controlling—then a judge tasked with applying
the jurisdiction’s law ought to recognize the practice as an aberration
and refrain from following it. Whether or not the jurisdiction’s own
courts would classify the aberrational practice as legally binding is not
dispositive as to how the law-applying court should proceed. The
jurisdiction’s stare decisis jurisprudence could be mistaken.157
In the early case of Bell v. Morrison, the Supreme Court noted that
the “rules of interpretation” that a state’s tribunals use on their own
statutes “must be presumed to be founded upon a more just and
accurate view of their own jurisprudence, than those of any foreign
tribunal, however respectable.”158 That statement nicely captures a
Dworkinian point of view on interpretation: it is not that a state’s own
interpretive methods must be followed simply because they are the
state’s methods, but rather because those methods will produce the
best constructive interpretation of the state’s own law. This idea

155 The Texas court that construed the federal plurality decision of Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1995), to stand for the majority-endorsed principles contained in it
might have been moved by the recognition that federal courts generally follow a
majoritarian approach to precedent formation. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying
text. The court’s approach to the federal decision perhaps demonstrates an attempt to
realize that majoritarian principle despite the fractured nature of the decision. Evidence
that the majoritarian principle underlies the federal system of precedent includes the
federal practice of looking to majority opinions for holdings, as well as judicial
pronouncements that majority views and only those create binding precedent. See, e.g., CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987) (observing that the reasoning
contained in an opinion is binding if and only if it “represent[s] the views of a majority of
the Court”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942) (asserting that “the lack of an
agreement by a majority of the Court on the principles of law involved prevents [a decision]
from being an authoritative determination for other cases”); see also Williams, supra note
48, at 845 (characterizing a “commitment to majority decisionmaking” as a “broadly
accepted convention[] of Supreme Court decisionmaking that [is] highly relevant to
assessing the precedential significance of the Court’s pronouncements”).
156 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 126.
157 As Dworkin explained, judges can make mistakes “either because they rely on poor
background moral or political theory, or because they make more pedestrian errors of
analysis.” Id. at 313.
158 Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 359–60 (1828).
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assumes that a state’s own judges are good law-as-integrity judges,
something we should perhaps not take for granted; accordingly, we
might add the qualification that law-applying judges should defer to
the law-supplying judges’ interpretive methods to the extent that they are
“founded upon a more just and accurate view of their own
jurisprudence” than those of any outside tribunal.159
Indeed, the Bell Court, which was applying Kentucky statutory law,
went on to observe that it has a “duty to follow out the spirit of
[Kentucky’s judicial decisions], so far as [it is] enabled to gather the
principles on which they are founded, and apply them to the case at
bar.”160 The Court thereby indicated that it was not limited to the text
of Kentucky’s judicial decisions or narrow holdings expressed there,
even though Kentucky’s own courts might interpret precedent in a
more literal or textualist way. Sounding very Dworkinian indeed, the
Supreme Court here suggests a particular approach to ascertaining the
precedential effect of judicial decisions that might well depart
somewhat from the approach of Kentucky courts and uses the
approach to ascertain the legal effect of Kentucky decisions. Dworkin’s
theory of law entails an account of “how law is to be identified” that
incorporates the value of integrity.161 In Bell, the Court attempts to
make out Kentucky law in a way that realizes, and prioritizes, integrity;
from a Dworkinian point of view, the federal court might thereby
diverge somewhat from Kentucky courts in its interpretive approach
and at the same time fulfill its duty to apply Kentucky law.
Since interpretive methodology is itself a legal practice, a lawapplying court should include a jurisdiction’s interpretive methods as
input in the constructive interpretation enterprise: this may or may not
require the court to apply a particular interpretive method of the lawsupplying jurisdiction, depending on its content and the relationship
between that content and the all the other legal practices that the court
must take into account in the process of constructive interpretation.
In some cases, a law-applying jurisdiction might have a legal duty to
apply the law-supplying jurisdiction’s interpretive methods even if
from the point of view of law as integrity it would be better for the lawsupplying jurisdiction to use a different interpretive methodology.
The law-applying judges have to take the source jurisdiction’s legal
materials, including stare decisis doctrines, as they find them.
In many cases, though, under law as integrity a law-applying court
should refrain from following the interpretive protocols of the lawsupplying jurisdiction. Some of the methods for interpreting plurality

159
160
161

Id. at 360.
Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
DWORKIN, supra note 125, at 145, 177.
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decisions that courts have embraced are both difficult to justify and fail
to fit well with other existing legal practices. For example, the
narrowest grounds rule would afford binding effect to the view of a
minority of judges on the court, defying the majoritarian principle that
underlies the system of precedent (in U.S. jurisdictions at least) and
moreover giving precedential weight to rationales that are unlikely to
actually best justify the decision.162 Consider the Supreme Court’s
decision in Freeman v. United States, where the Justices divided 4–1–
(4).163 Until Freeman was overruled,164 most of the lower federal courts
treated the concurring opinion of Justice Sotomayor as binding, since
it advanced the narrowest rationales in favor of the judgment in the
case.165 No other justices agreed with her opinion, however, and so it
is unlikely that her reasoning in fact represents the principles that best
justify the outcome of the case. The principles endorsed by the four
justices joining the plurality opinion likely represent a better
justification for the decision. Accordingly, if a state judge is charged
with deciding a question of federal law, law as integrity might counsel
against the judge following the narrowest grounds rule, even though
that rule represents the dominant approach in the federal courts. As
Dworkin explained, it is the “set of principles” that in fact “best
justif[y] the precedents” that are binding in subsequent cases.166
For Dworkin, the system of precedent itself is best justified by the
principle of fairness: “[t]he gravitational force of a precedent may be
explained by appeal . . . to the fairness of treating like cases alike.”167
Courts, then, are not permitted to pick and choose which judicial
decisions will be precedential—that behavior would not fit a practice
that rests on the principle of fairness. If a new dispute resembles a past
one, then judges should treat them the same. Nevertheless, many
courts declare and treat certain subsets of decisions as nonprecedential. For some courts, plurality decisions are nonbinding.168
Of greater consequence, both state and federal intermediate appellate
courts mark a large proportion of their decisions as “unpublished” and

162 See supra subsection I.C.3 for an overview of the narrowest grounds rule.
163 564 U.S. 522, 524 (2011). As before, parentheses signify dissenting votes.
164 The Supreme Court overruled Freeman in Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765
(2018).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1013 (11th Cir. 2017)
(determining that Justice Sotomayor’s Freeman opinion controls under Marks and noting
that “eight sister circuits” have made the same determination), rev’d on other grounds, 138 S.
Ct. at 1778.
166 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 116–118.
167 Id. at 113; see also id. at 116 (asserting that “the general justification of the practice
of precedent” is “fairness”).
168 See, e.g., supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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deny precedential authority to those decisions.169 A good Dworkinian
judge might disregard that directive and recognize the force that all of
a jurisdiction’s previous decisions have over subsequent cases. A
federal court, for instance, should perhaps treat an unpublished
decision of a state court as an authoritative piece of state law even if
the state’s own courts deny authority to unpublished decisions.
Without naming it as such, some judges have expressed this
Dworkinian point of view in response to the increasingly common
judicial practice of issuing unpublished decisions. Justice Markman of
the Michigan Supreme Court, for example, opined against a proposed
amendment to the Michigan Court Rules that would “provide that
citing an unpublished opinion is ‘disfavored’”: Markman maintained
that a legitimate judicial decision will necessarily carry the force of law
and that the court accordingly has no basis on which to discourage
parties from citing any such decision.170 Judge Arnold of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly maintained that whenever judges
exercise the judicial power they necessarily make declarations of law
that are binding in subsequent cases.171 A judge cannot do the former
without also doing the latter. For both Markman and Arnold, then, a
court cannot change the precedential nature of a decision by marking
the opinion as unpublished and acting as though unpublished decisions
are not legally binding. When courts do act in that way, they are
violating the law, not defining it.
Consistent with Markman’s and Arnold’s views, when courts
interpret the law of another jurisdiction, they sometimes treat past
decisions made by the other jurisdiction’s courts as precedential
regardless of the other jurisdiction’s stance on the binding force of
those decisions. In the adjudication of state law questions, federal
courts sometimes treat unpublished state decisions as authorities, even
if the states have practices or rules that deny precedential status to

169 See, e.g., David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over
Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2005) (discussing the phenomenon of
unpublished and nonprecedential opinions in the federal courts of appeals); Stephen R.
Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and Analysis, 5 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 473 (2003) (discussing unpublished opinions in both state and federal appellate
courts).
170 Order Proposing Amendment of Rule 7.215 of the Michigan Court Rules, ADM
File No. 2014-09, at 3–4 (Feb. 18, 2015) (Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (asserting that any “legitimate product of the ‘judicial power’” carries the force of law
and that, regardless of the form in which a court expresses its decision, so long as a case has
been decided, that decision “will constitute the bona fide law of this state and will
contribute . . . to defining the body of law from which the precedents of this state must be
identified”).
171 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), opinion vacated on reh’g en
banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
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unpublished decisions and sometimes even if the states have rules
prohibiting citation to such decisions.172 These federal practices may
be appropriate from a Dworkinian point of view. If the doctrines of
precedent that we see in the United States, despite some differences
among them, are generally justified by a principle of fairness, then
under the theory of law as integrity judges ought to afford precedential
weight to all of a jurisdiction’s judicial decisions, even in cases where
the jurisdiction’s own courts would fail to do so.
Many commentators have suggested, to the contrary, that when a
court applies the law of another jurisdiction, that court ought to step
into the place of a court in the foreign jurisdiction—to act as the
foreign court would—since a jurisdiction is sovereign over its own body
of law. According to Professor Lea Brilmayer, “[w]hen applying
another state’s law, . . . judges are supposed to exercise no creative
judgment, but rather implement mechanically whatever a relevant
state court has decided to do with the issue”: judges must make
decisions that “avoid[] intrusions into other states’ sovereignty,
minimiz[e] forum shopping through the pursuit of decisional
uniformity, [and] maximiz[e] predictability.”173 Indeed, these considerations represent basic choice-of-law values.174
We can accept, however, that a jurisdiction is sovereign over its
own body of law without accepting that a federal court adjudicating a
172 See, e.g., Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 152 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988)
(relying on an unpublished New Jersey Court of Appeals decision; noting that a New Jersey
Rule “precludes a court from citing such an opinion”; and asserting that “[t]he New Jersey
rules are, of course, binding only on the New Jersey courts, and we would be remiss in our
duty to apply New Jersey law were we to ignore a New Jersey case where the relevant issue is
identical”); Aviles v. Burgos, 783 F.2d 270, 283 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (following an unpublished
decision from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico; noting a Puerto Rico Rule providing that
it is “improper to cite as an authority or precedent [such a decision]”; and stating that they
“have relied upon it” anyway, since “all the parties have had access to the opinion and
because it is a well-reasoned and complete opinion”); see also In re Schmelzer, 480 F.2d 1074,
1076 n.1 (6th Cir. 1973) (citing an unreported Ohio case, noting that an Ohio statute
“requires that an opinion be reported in the official reports before it is recognized by and
given the official sanction of any court” and asserting that the statute “does not seem to be
enforced by the Ohio Courts . . . or by our Court”); Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 154 F.2d
961, 962 (6th Cir. 1946) (asserting that “it is the duty of the federal courts ‘in every case to
ascertain from all the available data what the state law is and apply it’” and concluding that
it would follow an unreported Ohio state decision even if Ohio courts would disregard the
decision given its unreported status (quoting West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 225
(1940))), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866 (1946). Dorf discusses this kind of federal court practice
in Prediction and the Rule of Law. Dorf, supra note 82, at 713–14.
173 Lea Brilmayer & Charles Seidell, Jurisdictional Realism: Where Modern Theories of
Choice of Law Went Wrong, and What Can Be Done to Fix Them, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2031, 2063,
2067 (2019).
174 See id. at 2063; see also Lea Brilmayer, The Other State’s Interests, 24 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 233, 236 (1991).

2022]

STARE DECISIS AND INTERSYSTEMIC ADJUDICATION

1255

state claim should act as though it is a court of the state and emulate
the interpretive approach that the state’s courts would use. As
Dworkin would put it, the job of Hercules is not “to replicate what
other judges do,” but rather “to enforce the genuine institutional
rights of those who came to his court.”175 From a Dworkinian point of
view, a federal court might even exhibit greater deference to the state’s
law by declining to wholly follow that state’s stare decisis doctrine.
Suppose, for example, that the courts of some state, say Nevada, issue
unpublished opinions and disavow the legal authority of those
opinions. If a federal court nonetheless attributes precedential force
to all Nevada decisions (and if Dworkin and others are correct that
judicial decisions necessarily carry this force), then the federal court
might be more likely than a Nevada state court to resolve a particular
new case correctly under Nevada law. Federal courts can thus respect
a state’s sovereignty and its autonomy over its own body of law without
necessarily deferring to the state’s doctrines of stare decisis.
Further, when applying the law of another jurisdiction, judges
may be justified in exercising more creative leeway in interpretation
than judges applying their own law. Discussing the choice-of-law
context, Brilmayer and Charles Seidell assert just the opposite: “[a]
common law cause of action arising under forum law can be treated
with much greater freedom of judgment than a common law cause of
action arising under the law of another state.”176 And they observe
that, “[t]his phenomenon has been noted frequently in analogous
jurisdictional situations, such as when a federal judge is charged with
applying the law of the state in which she sits.”177 If a court is tasked
with applying the law of another jurisdiction and does not have the
power to overrule that other jurisdiction’s precedent, however, then
the court might have to interpret the law creatively—reading prior
cases in a way that makes them justifiable and consistent with one
another—in order to reach decisions in new cases that satisfy the law
as integrity aims of justification and fit. In contrast, when judges
interpret their own jurisdiction’s law, they may not need to exercise as
175 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 123.
176 Brilmayer & Seidell, supra note 173, at 2066. Professor Anthony Bellia presents
empirical evidence suggesting that state judges historically viewed themselves as having
greater freedom of judgment when interpreting their own law compared to federal law.
Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1501 (2006). He finds that “state courts historically interpreted ‘their own’ statutes ‘more
freely’ than they interpreted federal statutes,” and in particular that state courts used “forms
of equitable interpretation” on their own statutes but not on federal statutes. Id. at 1552,
1507, 1515–29.
177 Brilmayer & Seidell, supra note 173, at 2067; see also Brilmayer, supra note 174, at
234 (“When a judge applies the law of another jurisdiction, his or her creative leeway is
fairly circumscribed.”).
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much creativity, provided that they (or judges on courts above them)
have the power to overturn aberrational cases. From a Dworkinian
point of view, then, judges engaged in intersystemic interpretation
might sometimes have a legal duty to diverge from the law-supplying
jurisdiction’s approach to stare decisis.
2. Epistemology and Interpretive Methodology
On the other hand, for epistemic reasons, law as integrity might
sometimes counsel courts in the intersystemic context to set aside
particular precedents of the law-supplying jurisdiction rather than
attempting to salvage them through a creative interpretation. As Gluck
observes, federal courts interpreting state statutes often decline to
apply creative methods of statutory interpretation, such as
constitutional avoidance, “despite the fact that federal courts often
apply those doctrines in federal cases and . . . state courts themselves
apply those canons in their own cases.”178 In Ways v. City of Lincoln, for
example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a
Nebraska ordinance concerning sexual entertainment was unconstitutionally broad without attempting to save the ordinance through a
strained interpretation.179 While acknowledging the possibility of a
limiting construction, the federal court stated that such “constructions
of state and local legislation are more appropriately done by a state
court or an enforcement agency.”180 The canon of constitutional
avoidance calls upon courts to construe a statute that would seem to
present constitutional problems as if it were consistent with the
constitution.181 Perhaps, under law as integrity, judges should hesitate
to apply constitutional avoidance to another jurisdiction’s statutes,
even if the other jurisdiction’s courts embrace the canon, since they

178 Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1904.
179 274 F.3d 514, 519 (8th Cir. 2001).
180 Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795–96 (1989)). For criticism
of this case and others where federal courts have seemed reluctant to apply the
constitutional avoidance canon to state statutes, see Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1953.
181 More precisely, constitutional avoidance comes in two versions: the first “concerns
situations in which a statute would be actually unconstitutional if interpreted in one way
but not another,” in which case “the canon directs the court to choose the construction
that saves the statute, even if it is a worse or even quite strained reading, so long as the saving
construction is possible”; the second version of the canon, which is applicable more often,
“does not require that one of the candidate interpretations would render the statute
actually unconstitutional but instead requires only that the interpretation would raise
serious constitutional doubts.” Bruhl, supra note 2, at 467–68.
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might be ill-equipped to come up with a creative interpretation that
provides a good fit with the rest of the relevant body of law.182
The same line of reasoning applies to doctrines of precedent:
some methods of construing precedents are difficult for judges to
apply even to their own court’s precedent—for example, the Marks
narrowest grounds rule—let alone another jurisdiction’s precedent. A
judge attempting to generate a constructive interpretation of another
jurisdiction’s law might be more likely to succeed if she sets aside
fractured decisions, even if those decisions would be binding under
the stare decisis doctrine of the law-supplying jurisdiction.
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity is often criticized for being
overly demanding of judges, since it calls on them to make decisions
that both fit and justify the entire relevant body of existing law: as
Dworkin put it, “law as integrity . . . requires a judge to test his
interpretation of any part of the great network of political structures
and decisions of his community by asking whether it could form part
of a coherent theory justifying the network as a whole.”183 Dworkin
conceded that “[n]o actual judge could compose anything
approaching a full interpretation of all his community’s law at once.”184
He suggested, however, that “an experienced judge will have a
sufficient sense of the terrain surrounding his immediate problem to
know instinctively which interpretation of a small set of cases would
survive if the range it must fit were expanded.”185 But Dworkin took
for granted that judges interpret the law of the society in which they
are embedded, and he neglected to contemplate the intersystemic

182 For the same reason, federal courts should be wary of interpreting state statutes
using a dynamic approach, whereby judges update or refine statutes “to reach unforeseen
problems”; indeed, federal courts have declined to use the dynamic approach on state
legislation even in cases where the state’s supreme court would interpret the statute at issue
dynamically. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1927 (discussing this
phenomenon). The same argument could be made for severability—“a judicially created
doctrine which recognizes a court’s obligation to uphold the constitutionality of legislative
enactments where it is possible to remove the unconstitutional portions” while preserving
the rest. State v. Catalano, 104 So. 3d 1069, 1080 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of State v.
Mangat, 43 So. 3d 642, 649 (Fla. 2010)); see also Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678,
684 (1987) (“[W]henever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions separable
from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and to
maintain the act in so far as it is valid.” (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652
(1984) (plurality opinion))). Epistemic constraints might also explain why the lower
federal courts rely less on the canon of constitutional avoidance than the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Bruhl, supra note 27, at 44 (providing empirical evidence to this effect).
183 DWORKIN, supra note 153, at 245. But see, e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 122,
at 939–40 (suggesting that judges “are not well-equipped to engage in [the kind of]
theoretically ambitious tasks” that Dworkin set out for them).
184 DWORKIN, supra note 153, at 245.
185 Id.
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context in which judges interpret the laws of other jurisdictions. In
this context judges might do better under law as integrity to set some
decisions aside rather than strain to fit them within their constructive
interpretation, even if the law-supplying jurisdiction’s own judges
would preserve them. For example, it may be futile for judges to
attempt to reconstruct a fractured decision from another jurisdiction
such that it is both justified and coherent in light of all of the
jurisdiction’s other legal practices.
Further, stare decisis methodology itself tends to be both
complicated and elusive, and more prone to obscurity than first-order
rules of decision and even than methods of statutory interpretation.
Even though judges employ methods of following precedent all the
time, they typically do so without justifying or otherwise reflecting on
their interpretive moves.186 For outsider judges then, a jurisdiction’s
prevailing stare decisis doctrine may be particularly difficult to discern
and implement effectively. Outsider judges, compared to insider ones,
have epistemic disadvantages with respect to ascertaining and applying
the applicable law, which might sometimes justify a difference in
interpretive approach.187
In sum, under the theory of law as integrity, a federal court
deciding a question of state law should not necessarily follow the state’s
186 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
187 Other scholars have suggested similarly that epistemic differences between judges
of different courts might justify the application of different interpretive methods to the
same body of law. Focusing on the intrajurisdictional context, Bruhl argues that lower
federal courts should and in fact do use different (less complicated and fewer) methods of
interpretation than the Supreme Court because, among other reasons, the courts differ in
terms of resources, competencies, and access to materials. See supra notes 2, 27. For some
of the same reasons Bruhl delineates, courts applying another jurisdiction’s law might do a
better job if they use methods of interpretation that differ from those that the law’s home
courts would use. See also Pojanowski, supra note 2, at 502–07 (describing the idea of
“calibrat[ing] interpretive method with the practical competences of the interpreter” and
suggesting that state court methods of interpreting state statutes should perhaps diverge
from federal methods of interpreting federal statutes because state and federal judges have
different competencies). These considerations also suggest that federal judges interpreting
state statutes should not necessarily take up state interpretive methods. Id. at 539. For
example, suppose that a state embraces a purposive approach to interpretation and
regularly relies on legislative history to ascertain the purpose of its statutes; a federal court
or another state might be poorly positioned, at least relative to the state’s home courts, to
ascertain the state’s legislative purpose. See, e.g., Somers v. Com. Fin. Corp., 139 N.E. 837,
839 (Mass. 1923) (“We cannot speak with the same confidence of the intention and the
policy of the Legislature of another state as we might of those of our own.” (quoting Folger
v. Columbian Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 267, 275 (1868))). Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 122,
argue along similar lines that evaluations of interpretive methodology should be sensitive
to institutional competencies, and in particular that different types of interpreter—for
example judges and agencies—have different capacities, which warrant different
interpretive approaches.
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stare decisis doctrines because those doctrines might impede the
court’s ability to produce the best constructive interpretation of the
state’s law.
3. Are U.S. Judges Dworkinians?
Gluck observes that, for many judges, interpretive methods “do
not ‘feel’ like other types of substantive law.”188 “Perhaps because
some judges view interpretation as a core aspect of the judicial
function,” she suggests, they believe that rules meant to govern
interpretive methodology interfere with a judge’s ability to exercise the
judicial power.189 Lending support to this idea, in an empirical study
of judicial perspectives on the status of interpretive methodology,
Gluck and former Judge Richard Posner found that U.S. federal
appellate judges generally believe that they are not bound by
interpretive methods advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court.190 Some
of the judges whom Gluck and Posner surveyed went so far as to suggest
that exercising interpretive freedom is “the essence of being a judge”:
for these respondents, judging means applying the interpretive
method that will yield “the best reading” of the law at issue, and
interpretive protocols prescribed by others will not necessarily yield the
best reading.191
This view is justifiable under law as integrity: to realize the vision
of Dworkin’s theory of law, judges need to have discretion to apply
whatever methods of interpretation will best enable them to ascertain
the principles that support a jurisdiction’s legal practices as a whole
and to decide a given case consistently with those principles. This
insight is critical to the interpretation of precedent in the intersystemic
context because, as I have shown, the prevailing doctrines of stare
decisis in the law-supplying jurisdiction may or may not meet the
demands of law as integrity, especially when outsider judges are the
ones in charge of applying the law.

188 Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1827.
189 Id.; see also Bernard W. Bell, Metademocratic Interpretation and Separation of Powers, 2
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 27 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he task of interpreting statutes
requires the interpreter to determine the interpretive principles it will employ”); James J.
Brudney & Ethan J. Leib, Statutory Interpretation as “Interbranch Dialogue”?, 66 UCLA L. REV.
346, 379 (2019) (observing that legislated rules of statutory interpretation “trench on an
interpretive domain that tends to be zealously guarded by the courts for separation of
powers reasons”).
190 Gluck & Posner, supra note 19, at 1343–48.
191 Id. at 1314, 1320. But see Bruhl, supra note 18, at 162 (finding, through an empirical
study of decisionmaking in the federal courts, that “[t]he [methodological precedent] we
currently have is meaningful,” and that lower federal courts in particular view propositions
and canons of statutory interpretation as binding law).
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4. Is Interpretive Methodology Special?
One might reasonably wonder whether my Dworkinian analysis of
interpretation in the intersystemic context proves too much: if lawapplying judges are not bound by the stare decisis doctrine of the lawsupplying jurisdiction, on what basis are they bound to apply any of the
norms, including rules of conduct, that are legally binding from the
point of view of the law-supplying jurisdiction’s own legal officials?
Indeed, under law as integrity, a law-applying judge is not
necessarily bound to follow even a given rule of conduct that
represents a legally binding norm from the point of view of officials in
the law-supplying jurisdiction. The law-supplying courts might be
mistaken not only about interpretive methodology, but also any other
legal norms, including those governing primary conduct. Nevertheless, I believe that doctrines of precedent are meaningfully different
from first-order precedent for the purposes of a Dworkinian analysis of
the intersystemic deference problem.
This is because, for one, even when courts treat or appear to treat
methods of interpretation as legal rules, they often arise from the
personal opinions and philosophies of judges. For example, Professor
Rupert Cross described methods of interpretation as “statements of
attitude,” “approach,” or “position,” and as “examples of judicial
practice,” which reflect “opinion[s] about the proper judicial role”: in
this sense, Cross viewed interpretive methods as importantly different
from other types of legal rules and principles.192 Even when a
jurisdiction converges on some transsubstantive method of interpretation, the convergence seems often to be a consequence of historical
happenstance or the personal views of particular judges, or a
combination of the two, which supports Cross’s view of the distinction
between interpretive methodology and other types of legal norms.
For example, in Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court relied
on the narrowest grounds rule to construe a plurality decision,
apparently without much thought and in any event without offering
any justification for the rule. A justification has not appeared in
subsequent cases and is hard to come by, although some commentators have tried.193 The Marks rule seems to be a matter of historical
happenstance, and it is not clear that it serves any deep or systemic

192 CROSS, supra note 9, at 42–43, 197; see also Greenawalt, supra note 124, at 657
(suggesting that the “prevailing interpretive standards typically exercise less constraint than
clear precedents that establish rules of law” and that a prevailing standard of interpretation
“does make a difference, but even such a standard does not bind as strongly as authoritative
constitutional or statutory materials or even as strongly as typical precedential rules of law”).
193 See, e.g., Stearns, supra note 48.
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principles that would justify applying it over alternatives, at least from
a law as integrity point of view.
For an example of how interpretive methodology may be driven
by the personal ideologies or philosophies of judges, consider
Michigan Supreme Court’s history of statutory interpretation. Gluck
delineates how, in the late 1990s, four “self-described textualist[s]”
joined the court “with a mission to change the way the state court
approached statutory interpretation” and the state’s courts accordingly came to embrace a predominantly textualist methodology.194
“[B]ickering over methodological choice continue[d] among the
[Michigan] justices,” however, given that some purposivists remained
on the court and continued to express their purposivist views.195 As
Gluck observes, examples of philosophically or ideologically divided
courts make one wonder “to what extent even an apparently neutral
methodological regime can constrain courts with major internal
divisions.”196
Relatedly, judges seem to readily overrule methodological
precedents (or to deny that they are actually precedents), perhaps
because judges view interpretation as both personal and philosophical.
Judges seem to be more comfortable applying some substantive
doctrine—say, a rule of contract law—that they believe is unwise than
applying an interpretive approach that they object to. For example,
Justice Zarella of the Connecticut Supreme Court has described
interpretive disagreement within her court as “philosophical
disagreement” and has suggested that methods of statutory interpretation such as the “plain meaning rule” are not amenable to
precedential effect.197
Jurists have made similar assertions about stare decisis
methodology. For example, during oral argument in Hughes v. United
194 Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1804.
195 Id. at 1808.
196 Id. at 1798.
197 State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 610–11 (Conn. 2003) (Zarella, J., dissenting);
see also Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564, 570 n.36 (Mich. 2009) (Kelly, J.,
concurring) (asserting that the “tools of statutory interpretation . . . are not ‘binding’ in
the same sense as is the holding . . . and stare decisis does not apply to them”); Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that
transsubstantive interpretive methods such as the Auer rule “exceed the limits of stare
decisis” (quoting Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law
of Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1159 (2019))). As Adrian Vermeule observes,
“interpretive doctrine appears markedly unstable, fluctuating rather dramatically over short
periods”; the Supreme Court “has changed its practice, and sometimes the formally stated
rules,” “on subjects such as the role of purposive considerations in interpretation, the use
of extrinsic (or nontextual) sources, and the role of particular canons of construction . . .
with remarkable frequency.” Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 149, 149 (2001).
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States, where the Court was asked to clarify the meaning of the Marks
narrowest grounds rule, Justice Breyer suggested that doing so was
inadvisable if not impossible, given that the role of judges in a common
law system is to determine for themselves how best to make sense of
and follow precedent: “There are no absolute rules” for the purpose,
Breyer asserted.198
Law as integrity does not require judges to necessarily follow the
law-supplying jurisdiction’s stare decisis doctrine, but rather to rely on
it only to the extent that doing so would help them come up with a
successful constructive interpretation of the rest of the jurisdiction’s
legal practices. To the extent that stare decisis methodology reflects
deep philosophical commitments including about the very nature of
law, we cannot expect a judge’s approach to depend entirely on which
jurisdiction’s law they happen to be interpreting; instead, we should
expect some transsystemic constancy in a particular judge’s stare
decisis jurisprudence.
Further, as I discussed in subsection 2 above, a jurisdiction’s preferred or prevailing interpretive approach—and especially methods of
interpreting precedent—are likely to be more difficult for outsider
judges to ascertain and apply than the jurisdiction’s primary rules of
conduct. The epistemological differences between law-applying and
law-supplying judges in the intersystemic context suggest that judges
adjudicating a dispute might be less likely to reach the right answer if
they attempt to follow the stare decisis methodology of the lawsupplying jurisdiction.
From the point of view of law as integrity, then, interpretive
methodology may differ fundamentally from other types of legal
practice.
*

*

*

In this Part, I have argued that we cannot answer the question of
whether and in what cases doctrines of precedent are interjurisdictionally binding without resolving fundamental and longdisputed questions about the nature of law. I have shown how, under
neither positivism nor law as integrity is the law-supplying jurisdiction’s
stare decisis methodology unconditionally binding on the law-applying
court, although for a positivist it typically will be.
My account suggests that many judges in the U.S. do not view
intersystemic adjudication as a positivist should, but that their conduct

198 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018)
(No. 17-155).
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is consistent with the alternative legal theory of law as integrity.199 In
contrast, scholars who claim that judges legally ought to defer to the
interpretive methods of the law-supplying jurisdiction, whatever they
may be, would seem to be unsympathetic to law as integrity, which does
not support that claim. The widespread, if often only implicit,
commitment to positivism among legal scholars today might explain
why many of them insist that a good law-applying judge will faithfully
adopt the interpretive methods of the law-supplying jurisdiction.200
CONCLUSION
State judges have the prerogative, under principles of federalism
and Erie’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, to establish state
decisional law that is applicable in both state and federal courts: a
federal court “cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made
unavailable by the State.”201 But how is a federal judge to determine
whether a right to recover is made available by state precedent?
Federal courts confront this issue when they exercise diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. And state courts face
the same kind of question when they adjudicate cases arising under
federal or another state’s law, as do courts when they apply the laws of
foreign countries. This problem, although fundamental and ubiquitous, has been surprisingly undertheorized.
Scholars have generally assumed that a jurisdiction’s right to
create its own body of precedent entails the right to determine how
legal meaning will be derived from its judicial decisions, wherever that
meaning may be derived—whether by internal or external courts—
such that a law-applying court is bound by the law-supplying
jurisdiction’s stare decisis methodology. This Article has revealed the
limitations of that admittedly intuitive assumption, showing how
different legal theories generate different answers to the question of
whether, in a given case, a law-applying court legally ought to employ
the stare decisis jurisprudence of courts in the law-supplying jurisdiction. The Article thus illuminates the integral relationship between
199 I do not mean to suggest that all or even most judges self-consciously identify with
particular theories of law. As Professor Liam Murphy observes, “[m]ost judges . . . neither
announce their theory of law in their opinions nor write books or articles about the judicial
process, so it is hard to know what theory of law they hold.” LIAM MURPHY, WHAT MAKES
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 10 (2014). I do believe, however, that
most judges at least implicitly accept some theory of law, and that a judge’s approach to
decisionmaking—including, for example, the kinds of justifications that she takes as
appropriate—can reveal her underlying legal theoretic commitments.
200 See Greenberg, supra note 116, at 18, 50 (suggesting that Hart’s version of positivism
is “the most widely held theory of law” among legal theorists).
201 Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945).
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analytical jurisprudence and a ubiquitous quandary concerning
intersystemic adjudication.
Although this Article focused on methods of interpreting
precedent in the intersystemic context, its line of analysis could be
extended in various directions: for example, to statutory and
constitutional interpretation in the intersystemic context; to all kinds
of interpretation across courts within jurisdictions, across judges within
courts, and even across cases within judges; and perhaps to other types
of meta norms and practices as well.

